Auditor Locality, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing by Choi, Jong-Hag et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
8-2007
Auditor Locality, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing
Jong-Hag Choi
Seoul National University
Jeong-Bon Kim
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Aini QIU
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Yoonseok ZANG
Singapore Management University, yszang@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
and the Corporate Finance Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Choi, Jong-Hag; Kim, Jeong-Bon; QIU, Aini; and ZANG, Yoonseok. Auditor Locality, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing. (2007).
American Accounting Association Annual Meeting. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/25
 
 
Auditor Locality, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
 
Jong-Hag Choi, Jeong-Bon Kim, Aini Qiu, and Yoonseok Zang 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Current Draft  
October 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________ 
*Jong-Hag Choi is at Seoul National University (acchoi@snu.ac.kr). Jeong-Bon Kim is at 
Concordia University and The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (afjbkim@inet.polyu.edu.hk). 
Aini Qiu is at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (afqiu@inet.polyu.edu.hk). Yoonseok 
Zang is at Singapore Management University (yszang@smu.edu.sg). We appreciate the helpful 
comments of Rajib Doogar, Lee-Seok Hwang, Soo Young Kwon, Junghun Lee, Clive Lennox, 
Srini Sankaraguruswamy, and seminar participants at Seoul National University and Korea 
University. Kim acknowledges partial financial support for this project from The HK 
Polytechnic University’s central research grant.  
 
Correspondence: Yoonseok Zang, School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University, 
60 Stamford Road, Singapore 178900. Tel: +65-6828-0601. Fax: +65-6828-0600. E-mail: 
yszang@smu.edu.sg 
 1
 Auditor Locality, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing  
   
Abstract 
 
Using a large sample of U.S. audit client firms over the 2001-2004 period, this 
paper investigates whether and how the locality of auditor or the geographic proximity 
between auditors and clients affects audit quality and audit pricing. We use the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality. To capture the effect of 
auditor locality, we differentiate local auditors from non-local auditors based on: (1) 
whether or not the practicing office of an audit engagement is located in the same state 
where the client is headquartered; and (2) the actual geographic distance between two 
cities where the auditor’s practicing office and the client’s headquarter are located. Our 
empirical results reveal the following: First, clients of local auditors report significantly 
lower abnormal accruals, compared with clients of non-local auditors, suggesting that 
local auditors provide higher-quality audits. Second, the fees paid to local auditors are, 
overall, not significantly different from those paid to non-local auditors. Further 
analyses show that local Big 4 auditors charge lower audit fees than non-local Big 4 
auditors. Overall, our results indicate that local audits enhance audit quality without 
imposing additional costs on clients in the same locale. 
 
Keywords: Auditor locality, Geographic proximity, Audit quality, and Audit pricing. 
 
Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.  
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 Auditor Locality, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the Enron debacle and the subsequent Andersen collapse, regulators, 
lawmakers, academic researchers, and the popular press have paid considerable 
attention to engagement-specific factors determining the auditor-client relationship and 
their impacts on audit quality. In particular, regulators have often expressed their 
concern that such engagement-specific characteristics as the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services by the same auditor, the length of the auditor-client relationship (or 
auditor tenure), and executives’ association with auditors could impair auditor 
independence and thus audit quality. Reflecting their concern, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX) prohibits the auditors from providing certain non-audit services to the 
same audit clients, requires mandatory rotations of audit partners, and imposes a new 
restriction that audit firm employees are prohibited for at least a one-year period from 
taking an executive position for their former client firms. Since the SOX enactment, 
many studies have examined the effect of non-audit fees, auditor tenure, executives 
being audit firm alumni on audit quality.1  
Unlike previous research, the focus of this paper is on a new engagement-
specific factor that may play an important role in the development of the auditor-client 
relationship, that is, the locality of auditors or the geographic proximity between 
auditors and clients. Just as the auditor-client relationship is built up over time (auditor 
                                                 
1 Refer to Frankel et al. (2002), Chung and Kallapur (2003), Larker and Richardson (2004), Reynolds et 
al. (2004) and Choi et al. (2006b) for research on the joint provision of audit and non-audit service; Myers 
et al. (2003), Choi and Doogar (2005), and Ghosh and Moon (2005) for the effect of auditor tenure on 
audit quality, and Lennox (2004) and Menon and Williams (2004) for the effect of executives’ affiliation 
with audit firms on going concern opinions and abnormal accruals, respectively.  
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tenure), or is established by personal ties between executives and audit firms (e.g., 
executives’ affiliations with auditor firms), or is further developed by the existence of 
economic rents (e.g., opportunities for lucrative non-audit services), the locality or the 
geographic proximity naturally facilitates the development of a close relationship 
between the two parties. Anecdotal evidence is consistent with the above view. For 
example, the Enron-Andersen relationship reveals that Enron was audited for 16 years 
(1985-2001) by Andersen’s practicing office in Houston where Enron was 
headquartered, Andersen’s Houston office earned more from non-audit services to 
Enron than from audit services, and Enron’s key accountants were Andersen’s former 
employees. This raises a natural question: Is the Enron-Andersen relationship facilitated 
by the fact that both were located in the same locale? Our study seeks to shed light on 
this question.  
In this paper, our primary interest lies in the issue of whether and how auditor 
locality affects audit quality and audit pricing. Is the locality of auditors an additional 
factor that maps into the auditor-client relationship and thus influences audit quality, 
after taking into account other engagement-specific factors that are deemed to influence 
audit quality? Does auditor locality impair or enhance audit quality? If auditor locality 
does affect audit quality, how is it reflected in the pricing of audit services? Our study 
aims to provide systematic evidence on these hitherto unexplored questions.  
To address these research questions, we need to obtain empirical measures of 
audit quality and auditor locality (or geographic proximity). As in many other studies 
(e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Choi et al. 2006b), we use the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality. To capture the effect of the 
auditor locality on audit quality and audit pricing, we differentiate local auditors from 
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non-local auditors. In our main analysis, we define an auditor as a ‘local (non-local) 
auditor’ if the practicing office of the audit engagement is located in the same (different) 
state boundary where its client is headquartered. Suppose that an auditor’s engagement 
office in New York has two clients located in two different states, New York and 
California. Under our definition above, the office is a local auditor for the New York 
client, and a non-local auditor for the California client. We adopt this state-based 
differentiation, because different states have different regulatory regimes or jurisdictions, 
and each state has its own CPA institute for the registration, licensing, and continuing 
education and training of practicing auditors.2 As such, the state-level analysis allows us 
to control for potential confounding effects of these cross-state differences on our 
results. 
However the state-level analysis has limitations because the auditor-client 
distance is more likely to be far away in large states such as California and Texas than 
small states, and the audits by out-of-state auditors are not uncommon in large 
metropolitan areas covering multiple states. To overcome these limitations, we also 
consider an alternative approach as part of our sensitivity analyses: Here we define an 
auditor as a local auditor if the audit engagement office is located within 150 miles 
away from the client’s headquarter, and as a non-local auditor if otherwise.3 For this 
purpose, we compute the actual geographic distances between auditors and clients in 
our sample. The geographic proximity may facilitate information flows between 
auditors and clients even when the near-distance auditor is located in a different state, as 
                                                 
2 Put differently, while auditors practicing in the same state are subject to the same legal and other 
regulatory requirements, auditors practicing in different states are subject to different legal, professional 
and/or training requirements. 
 
3 We also consider 100 or 200 miles as alternative thresholds, but the results are qualitatively similar.  
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it is likely to be the case in large metropolitan areas (e.g., the New York City area, the 
Chicago area, or the Washington-Baltimore area). Moreover, the use of this actual 
distance measure allows us to examine whether the geographic distance matters within 
the same state boundary or the distance does matter only when it is beyond a certain 
distance threshold (e.g., 150 miles). We therefore complement our main analysis using 
the actual distance measure as an alternative proxy for auditor locality.  
To better understand the role of the auditor locality or the geographic proximity 
in the development of auditor-client relationships, we investigate the following two 
distinct, but interrelated, issues. First, our analysis focuses on the effect of auditor 
locality on audit quality proxied by the magnitude of abnormal accruals. Compared with 
non-local auditors, local auditors are expected to have superior knowledge about their 
clients because they are in a better position to get access to (both financial and non-
financial) information about their clients. For example, local auditors are better able to 
obtain important client-specific information from local media. Local auditors can visit 
clients’ business units more easily, and talk to suppliers and employees more frequently. 
Local auditors may also be able to establish closer personal ties, and thus more reliable 
communication channels, with their clients in the same locale, compared with non-local 
auditors. On one hand, these information advantages alleviate information asymmetry 
between auditors and clients, and lead to local auditors evaluating and monitoring their 
clients more effectively than non-local auditors. As a result, local auditors are likely to 
provide higher-quality audits than non-local auditors, other things being equal. On the 
other hand, auditor locality may impair auditor independence and thus audit quality. 
With relatively closer personal ties between local auditors and their clients, local 
auditors are more likely to acquiesce to client pressure for allowing substandard 
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reporting, which in turn translates into lower-quality audits. Given the two opposing 
effects, it is an empirical question whether local auditors provide higher-quality audits 
than non-local auditors. To provide empirical evidence on this issue, we test whether 
clients of local auditors report a lower amount of abnormal accruals than clients of non-
local auditors.         
Second, we also examine the effect of auditor locality on audit pricing to obtain 
further insight into how the locality of auditors maps into the auditor-client relationship.  
Audit fees reflect audit quality as well as audit costs. On one hand, to the extent that 
local auditors provide higher-quality audits than non-local auditors, for example, 
through more effective monitoring, local auditors are able to charge higher audit fees 
than non-local auditors for the higher-quality services they offer. On the other hand, the 
geographic proximity and the information advantage that local auditors have over non-
local auditors may enable the local auditors to make more efficient assessment of client-
specific risk and other client characteristics, which may in turn lead them to save a 
nontrivial portion of audit engagement costs. In such a case, local auditors are likely to 
charge lower audit fees than non-local auditors. Given these two opposing effects, it is 
an empirical question whether local auditors enjoy a fee premium or not.  
Briefly, our empirical results reveal the following: First, we find that clients of 
local auditors report significantly lower abnormal accruals, compared with clients of 
non-local auditors. This result suggests that local auditors provide higher-quality audits 
than non-local auditors in the sense that they are more effective in constraining 
aggressive earnings management. Second, we find that the fees paid to local auditors are, 
overall, not significantly different from those paid to non-local auditors. Further 
analyses with the control for endogenous auditor choice reveal that local Big 4 auditors 
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charge lower audit fees (but not for non-audit or total fees) than non-local Big 4 
auditors, but local non-Big 4 auditors charge as much audit, non-audit or total fees as 
non-local non-Big 4 auditors. This finding is consistent with the view that, for Big 4 
auditors, the cost savings associated with local audits are sufficiently larger than the 
amount of potential audit fee premiums arising from higher-quality local audits. Overall, 
our results indicate that local audits enhance audit quality without imposing additional 
costs/fees on clients. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that identifies auditor locality as an additional 
engagement-specific characteristic which influences audit quality in the U.S. audit 
market. While previous research documents various engagement-specific factors that 
influence auditor independence and thus audit quality (e.g., the relative amount of non-
audit services and auditor tenure), it has paid little attention to the role of auditor 
locality or geographic proximity in shaping the auditor-client relationship and thus 
influencing audit quality. Our study provides supportive evidence on the positive effect 
of auditor locality on audit quality.   
Second, our study is also the first that considers auditor locality as a potential 
factor influencing audit pricing. Previous audit fee studies find that Big 4 brand name 
and industry expertise are priced in the competitive market for audit services (e.g., 
Craswell et al. 1995; Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 
2005; Choi et al. 2006a). However, no previous research has examined whether audit 
fees are influenced by auditor locality after other engagement-specific factors are 
accounted for. Evidence provided in our study fills this gap, and helps us better 
understand the nature and development of the auditor-client relationships.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop our   
research hypotheses. In section 3, we discuss the variable measurements and empirical 
models. In section 4, we describe our sample and present descriptive statistics. In 
section 5, we present empirical results. In section 6, we discuss potential self-selection 
biases associated with clients’ choice between local vs. non-local auditors, and offer 
further analyses.  The final section concludes the paper.   
 
2. Hypothesis Development   
2.1      Auditor locality and audit quality 
A CPA firm typically provides audit services to its clients through its   
practicing office located near their clients. In our sample, nearly 85% of clients are 
audited by auditors whose practicing offices are located in the same state where their 
clients are headquartered, and about 91% of clients are audited by auditors located 
within 150 miles from clients’ headquarters. Most audit engagements in local audits are 
well characterized by the geographic proximity between auditors and clients. This 
geographic proximity or auditor locality may have both positive and negative effects on 
audit quality as explained below.   
Several studies in the finance literature provide evidence that the geographic 
proximity among economic agents does matter in explaining their decision-making 
behavior and/or the contractual relationship among them. A growing body of research in 
the “home-bias” literature finds that equity investors overweight domestic stocks and 
underweight foreign stocks in their portfolio choices, primarily because they are more 
(less) familiar with domestic (foreign) stocks (e.g., Kang and Stulz 1997; Covrig et al. 
2006; Kim and Yi 2006). Evidence also shows that in the U.S. equity market, fund 
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managers and individual investors prefer to invest in locally headquartered firms, 
primarily because they are simply more familiar with local stocks, and have advantages 
in obtaining information about them (Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner 2005). Further, Malloy (2005) reports that geographically proximate 
analysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts, suggesting that 
the former have an information advantage over the latter and this information advantage 
leads to better forecasting performance. Kedia and Rajgopal (2005) provide evidence 
suggesting that the geographic proximity between firms and regulators is associated 
with a firm’s ex ante cost of misreporting which in turn affects the intensity of 
misreporting.     
In a similar vein, we argue that geographically proximate, local auditors are 
naturally more familiar with clients in the same locale, and have information advantages 
in the engagement with their clients, compared with non-local auditors. Local auditors 
have easier access to private information about their clients through direct 
communications with executives and other employees of client firms than non-local 
auditors. They have natural opportunities to establish closer personal ties, and thus, to 
maintain more reliable communication channels, with their clients, compared with non-
local auditors. In addition, they may be better able to obtain client-specific information 
from local media.  
On one hand, this information advantage and the facilitated communication 
alleviate information asymmetry between local auditors and their clients, help local 
auditors assess client-specific risk and other client characteristics more accurately, and 
allow them to better evaluate clients’ incentives and opportunities for substandard 
reporting. As such, local auditors are better able to monitor and evaluate clients’ 
 10
reporting behavior and to detect accounting errors or irregularities, compared with non-
local auditors. This in turn translates into higher-quality audits by local auditors. In this 
paper, the above prediction on a positive association between audit quality and auditor 
locality is conveniently called ‘the information perspective.’  
On the other hand, the geographic proximity or auditor locality may impair 
auditor independence and thus audit quality for the following reasons. With relatively 
closer ties between local auditors and their clients, local auditors are more likely to 
collude with their clients, and thus, to acquiesce to client pressure for allowing 
substandard reporting than non-local auditors, which translates into lower-quality 
audits. In this paper, this prediction on a negative association between audit quality and 
auditor locality is conveniently called ‘the collusion perspective.’ Extant evidence from 
China’s emerging market for audit services is consistent with the collusion perspective 
(Wang et al. 2005; Chan et al. 2006; Gul et al. 2006). For example, Gul et al. (2006) 
define local auditors as those auditors domiciled in the same administrative jurisdiction 
of the regional governments as their clients. They find that audit quality is, in general, 
lower for local auditors than for non-local auditors, because local auditors are more 
likely to be subject to political influences of the local government that is often the 
controlling shareholder of local firms. The role of political influences in shaping the 
auditor-client relationship is much more (less if not at all) salient in the Chinese (U.S.) 
audit environment. As evidenced in the well-publicized relationship between Enron and 
Andersen’s practicing office in Houston, however, one cannot rule out the possibility of 
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collusion between auditors and clients even in the market-based U.S. environment, in 
particular, where auditors are geographically proximate to their clients.4   
In short, the information perspective predicts the positive effect of auditor 
locality on audit quality, while the collusion perspective predicts the negative effect. To 
provide empirical evidence on which perspective is supported or whether one effect is 
dominated by the other effect, we test the following hypothesis in null form:  
H01: The level of earnings management, measured by the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals, is not significantly different between clients of local auditors 
and clients of non-local auditors, other things being equal.  
2.2 Auditor locality and audit pricing 
Like the suppliers of other professional services such as medical doctors and 
lawyers, auditors take into account both the cost of delivering audit services and the 
quality of audit services they deliver, when pricing their services. Consistent with this 
view, the extant audit pricing models, developed first by Simunic (1980) and further 
extended by Choi et al. (2006a), predict that audit costs, which are equal to audit fees at 
a competitive equilibrium, are a function of: (1) client characteristics such as client size, 
client complexity, and client-specific risk; and (2) auditor characteristics such as brand 
name and industry expertise that influence the quality of audit services. In this section, 
our focus is on an additional auditor characteristic which is presumed to affect audit 
pricing, that is, the locality of auditors or the geographic proximity between auditors 
and clients.   
Auditor locality may influence audit fees through its effect on the cost of 
delivering audit services and/or through its impact on audit quality. Anecdotal evidence 
                                                 
4 Some anecdotal evidence supports this prediction. For example, Health Management Inc.’s management 
and the audit partner of its CPA firm, BDO Seidman, lived in the neighborhood and maintained a very 
close relationship. Such a close tie could have impacted the audit quality and subsequently led to the audit 
failure of Health Management Inc. (Knapp 2005). 
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indicates that a concern over high costs of audits by non-local auditors motivates a 
client to switch its auditor from a non-local auditor to a local auditor. In its 8-K report 
filed to the Security and Exchange Commission on June 26, 1998, for example, 800 
Travel Systems, Inc. located in Tampa, Florida stated that the major reason for 
switching its non-local auditor domiciled in Dallas, Texas to a local auditor in Tampa is 
the higher audit costs associated with travel, lodging, long-distance communication, etc. 
As indicated in the above anecdotal evidence, geographically proximate, local auditors 
can save several types of audit contracting costs as described by Francis et al. (1999a):  
“ ….. lower audit contracting costs. These contracting costs include: (a) search 
costs for the auditor to identify potential clients having acceptable risk and 
revenue potential; (b) costs of delivering the audit, including transportation of 
audit teams to client sites; (c) client search costs in establishing the quality of the 
audit to be delivered by a particular accounting firm; and (d) client costs in 
monitoring the delivery and quality of contracted services.” (p.187) 
These savings in audit contracting costs, other things being equal, would allow local 
auditors to charge lower audit fees, compared with the fees charged by non-local 
auditors, leading to a negative relation between audit fees and auditor locality.   
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the information advantage and the 
facilitated communication channels that local auditors possess over non-local auditors 
may lead to more effective monitoring, and thus, higher-quality audits. As the quality is 
priced in the market for professional services (Tirole 1990), the providers of high-
quality services should be able to charge higher fees than those of low-quality services, 
as evidenced by the existence of fee premiums associated with Big 4 auditors and 
industry specialists (Craswell et al. 1995; Carcello et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Choi 
et al. 2006a). As a result, the higher-quality audits performed by local auditors should 
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enable them to charge a fee premium on their services, other things being equal. In such 
a case, one would observe a positive relation between audit fees and auditor locality.    
Given the two opposing effects of auditor locality on audit fees, it is an 
empirical question whether local auditors charge higher audit fees than non-local 
auditors. Thus, we test the following hypothesis in null form: 
H02: Audit fees charged by local auditors are not significantly different from 
those charged by non-local auditors, other thing being equal.  
 
3. Measurement of Variables and Model Specification 
3.1 Measurements of audit quality 
As in many previous studies (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2000; Frankel et al. 
2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Butler et al. 2004; etc.), we use the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals to proxy for audit quality. The magnitude of abnormal or 
discretionary accruals (DA) is regarded as an outcome of opportunistic earnings 
management in the literature. It is now well known that the traditional DA measure 
using the Jones (1991) model is noisy (e.g., DeFond and Francis 2005). To alleviate this 
concern, we adopt two alternative measures of DA. One is obtained from the augmented 
Jones model of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) which controls for the asymmetric 
timeliness of accruals in recognizing economic gains and losses. The other measure 
comes from the estimation of a performance-matched, modified Jones model (Kothari et 
al. 2005). We denote these two measures by DA1 and DA2, respectively.  
The augmented Jones model of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) in Eq. (1) explains 
the computation of our first measure DA1: 
               
jtjtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjtjt
DCFOACFODCFOACFO
APPEARECREVAACRA
jt
εβββ
βββ
++++
+Δ−Δ+=
−−
−−−−
]*)/[(]/[
]/[]/[(]/1[/C
16514
1312111                  (1)   
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where, for firm j and in year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals; A, ΔREV, and 
PPE represent total assets, changes in net sales, and gross property, plant and 
equipment, respectively; CFO represents cash flows from operation; DCFO is the 
dummy variable that equals 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise; 5 and ε is the error 
term. 
 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) show that accounting accruals recognize economic 
losses in a timelier manner than economic gains, and that accounting accruals are a 
piecewise linear function of current-period cash flows from operations. To incorporate 
this asymmetry between economic gains and losses into our accrual model, we include 
three additional variables, namely CFOjt/Ajt-1, DCFOjt, and (CFOjt/Ajt-1) * DCFOjt, into 
the modified Jones-model, as shown in Eq. (2) below.6  Using total accruals (ACCR) 
deflated by beginning total assets as the dependent variable, we estimate Eq. (1) for 
each two-digit, SIC-code industry and year.7  Our first measure DA1 is the difference 
between actual total accruals and the fitted values of Eq. (1). 
Our second measure of abnormal accruals, i.e., DA2, is computed as follows. 
For each two-digit SIC-code industry and year, we estimate the cross-sectional version 
                                                 
5 Note here that DCFO serves as a proxy for economic loss; Similar to Ball and Shivarkumar (2005), we 
also consider alternative proxies for economic loss, i.e., the dummy variable which has the value of 1 for 
changes in cash flows (ΔCFO) < 0, industry median-adjusted CFO < 0, or excess annual return (annual 
return minus annual market return) < 0; and 0 otherwise. Though not reported, the use of these alternative 
proxies for economic loss leads to similar results as those shown when we use DCFO as a proxy.     
 
6 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) demonstrate that their nonlinear or piecewise linear models are “a substantial 
specification improvement, explaining up to three times the amount of variation in accruals as conventional 
linear specifications” such as Jones (1991) model. (p.3)    
 
7As in other studies, total accruals (ACCR) are defined as income before extraordinary items minus 
operating cash flows taken directly from the statement of cash (i.e., cash flow approach). Alternatively, 
when we measure the total accruals by balance sheet approach (the changes in non-cash current accruals 
minus changes in current liabilities net of changes in long-term debt included in current liabilities minus 
depreciation and amortization expenses), the (unreported) results are almost identical. 
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of the modified Jones-model in Eq. (2). Residuals from Eq. (2) are DA before adjusting 
for firm performance. 
     jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt APPEARECREVAAACCR εααα ++Δ−Δ+= −−−− ]/[]/)[(]/1[/    1312111         (2) 
Kasznik (1999) and Kothari et al. (2005) point out that unadjusted DA is significantly 
correlated with firm performance. Following the procedures proposed by Kothari et al., 
we match each firm-year observation with another from the same two-digit SIC code 
with the closest return on assets (ROA) in each year. We then compute performance-
adjusted abnormal accruals, namely DA2, by taking the difference between the DA 
(before performance-based adjustment) and the ROA-matched firm’s DA. 
3.2 Empirical model for testing the effect of auditor locality on audit quality 
To test our first hypothesis H01, we estimate the following regression that links 
the magnitude of abnormal accruals with our variable of interest, i.e., auditor locality, 
and other control variables that are known to affect the extent of earnings management: 
            
jtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjt
sYearDummieIndustryLAGACCRCFOISSUE
LEVLOSSBTMCHGSALEINDSPEC
NASTENUREBIGLNTADSTATEDA
εααα
ααααα
αααααα
+++++
+++++
+++++=
&
4||
141312
1110987
653210
    (3)     
where, for firm j in year t, all variables are as defined in Table 1.  
The absolute value of abnormal accruals, denoted by |DA|, is our proxy for 
opportunistic earnings management. As explained in the preceding section, we consider 
two alternative proxies, that is: (1) absolute abnormal accruals measured by the Ball and 
Shivarkumar (2005) approach, denoted by |DA1|; and (2) absolute abnormal accruals 
measured by the Kothari et al. (2005) approach, denoted by |DA2|. DSTATE is our test 
variable which proxies for auditor locality in our main analysis. The DSTATE variable 
equals 1 if the auditor’s engagement office is located in the same state where a client is 
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headquartered, and 0 otherwise. As will be further discussed later on, we also consider 
alternative measures of auditor locality based on the actual geographic distance between 
auditors and clients as part of our sensitivity analyses.   
We include in Eq. (3) many control variables that are known to affect the extent 
of abnormal accruals. Evidence shows that large firms tend to report lower abnormal 
accruals than small firms (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002). We include LNTA in Eg. (3) 
to control for this client size effect. Several studies show that Big 4 auditors and 
industry specialists are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors and non-specialist, 
respectively, in constraining opportunistic earnings management (Becker et al. 1998; 
Francis et al. 1999b; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003). It is therefore important for 
our hypothesis testing to isolate the effect of auditor locality from the effect of auditor 
size or reputation and industry expertise. For this purpose, we include the BIG4 and 
INDSPEC variables in Eq. (3). We include TENURE in Eq. (3) because previous 
research by Johnson et al. (2002) and Myers et al. (2003) provides evidence that clients 
of longer tenure auditors have lower abnormal accruals. Frankel et al. (2002) provide 
evidence that abnormal accruals are greater for firms paying higher non-audit fees to 
their auditors, while the subsequent studies by Chung and Kallapur (2003) and 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) find no clear evidence on a positive relation between non-audit 
fees and abnormal accruals. We include NAS in Eq. (3) to isolate the audit locality effect 
on audit quality from the non-audit fee effect.    
BTM and CHGSALE are included to control for firm growth, while LOSS is 
included to control for potential differences in earnings management between loss and 
profit firms. We also include ISSUE to control for cross-sectional variations in financing 
transactions and their effects on earnings management. LEV is included because highly 
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leveraged firms may have higher incentives for earnings management due to their 
concerns over debt covenant defaults (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Becker et al. 1998). 
Evidence shows that the estimates of abnormal accruals using the Jones model or its 
variants are correlated with cash flows (Kasznik 1999; Butler et al. 2004; Kothari et al. 
2005). We include CFO in Eq. (3) to control for this potential correlation. As in 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Kim et al. (2003), we include lagged total accruals 
(LAGACCR) to control for the reversal of accruals over time. Finally, we include 
industry and year dummies to control for possible variations in accounting standards 
and regulations across industries and over years. 
3.3 Empirical model for testing the effect of auditor locality on audit pricing 
 To test our second hypothesis H02 regarding the effect of auditor locality on 
audit pricing, we posit the following regression that links audit fees with auditor 
locality, and other control variables that are known to influence audit price: 
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where for client firm j and in year t, all variables are as defined in Table 1. Our test 
variable, DSTATE, is the same as explained in the preceding section. The dependent 
variable, FEE, is measured as the natural log of the fees paid to auditors in thousand 
dollars. For the FEE variable, we consider three alternative fee metrics, that is: (1) audit 
fees which are fees paid to auditor for financial statements audits, denoted by AFEE; (2), 
non-audit fees which are fees paid to auditors for their non-audit services, denoted by 
NAFEE; and (3) total fees which are the sum of audit and non-audit fees, denoted by 
TFEE.   
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All control variables are measured as of the end of fiscal year unless otherwise 
noted. We include BIG4 and INDSPEC to capture the effects of auditor size or 
reputation and industry expertise, respectively, on audit pricing. Based upon evidence 
documented in previous research (e.g., Craswell et al. 1995; Francis et al. 2005; Choi et 
al. 2006a), we expect positive coefficients on both BIG4 and INDSPEC. Based upon 
evidence documented in previous research (e.g., Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2006a), we 
expect positive coefficients on all variables representing client size (LNTA and 
EMPLOY), the scope of business (NBS and NGS) and client complexity (INVREC, 
FOREIGN, and EXORD). Auditors typically charge less at the beginning of their tenure, 
which is called “low balling” in the literature (DeAngelo 1981). We include the dummy 
for auditor changes, AC, to control for the low-balling effect on audit pricing.   
 In addition, we include LOSS, LEV and ROA, to control for client-specific risk to 
be borne by auditors. Since auditors charge higher fees for risky clients (e.g., Simunic 
and Stein 1996), we expect the coefficients on LOSS and LEV (ROA) to be positive 
(negative). We include ISSUE and BTM in Eq. (4) to capture the effect of a client firm’s 
growth potential on auditors’ fees. Growing firms are more often involved in external 
financing activities such as equity and bond offerings. The demand for both audit and 
non-audit services is greater for high-growth firms than low-growth firms (Reynolds et 
al. 2004). We therefore expect a positive (negative) coefficient on ISSUE (BTM).   
Opportunistic earnings management may impact audit pricing too. Auditors may 
have to devote more time and effort to detecting earnings management by clients with 
higher magnitude of abnormal accruals, which in turn cause auditors to charge higher 
fees to such clients. However, it is possible that the magnitude of abnormal accruals is 
influenced by the fees paid to auditors. In such a case, a two-way causation may arise 
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between |DA| and FEE. To address this potential endogeneity problem, we first predict 
|DA| using Eq. (3). We then include the predicted value of |DA|, denoted by |DA*|, in 
Eq. (4). Finally we include industry and year dummies to control for variations in FEE 
across industries and over years.  
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE! ] 
 
4.  Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.   Sample  
The initial list of our sample consists of all firms included in the Audit Analytics 
database for the four-year period from 2001 to 2004. We extract data on the city-level 
locations of auditors’ practicing offices and client firms’ headquarters from the Audit 
Analytics database. After identifying the auditor and client locations, we obtain the 
latitude and longitude data for cities where the practicing office of each auditor and the 
headquarter of each client firm are located from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer 
2000 city-state (places.zip) file. Using these data, we first identify whether or not the 
practicing offices of auditors and the client headquarters are in the same state, and then 
compute the actual geographic distance between (the centers of) two cities where 
auditor offices and client headquarters are located.8 We exclude all client firms that are 
headquartered outside the 50 U.S. states because computing the geographic distance is 
problematic for these firms. In other words, we exclude, from our sample, client firms 
                                                 
8 When the practicing office of the auditor and the headquarter of the client are located in the same city, 
the distance is calculated as zero. It is possible that the effect of the auditor locality would be stronger 
when the two offices are located in a nearer-distance within the city, but data unavailability limits these 
analyses (i.e., no street-level address for the auditor's office is available in the Audit Analytics database, 
and no longitude or latitude data are available for the street-level address). 
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whose headquarters are located in any foreign countries or any other outlying U.S. 
territories (e.g., Puerto Rico, Virgin Island, Guam).9 
We also obtain audit and non-audit fees data from the Audit Analytics database. 
We retrieve all other financial data from the Compustat Industrial annual file. We 
exclude financial institutions and utility firms with their SIC codes being 6000-6999 
and 4900-4999, respectively, due to the difficulty in measuring their abnormal accruals. 
After applying the above selection procedures and data requirements, we obtain a total 
of 11,108 firm-years for the test of our first hypothesis, H01 and a total of 10,027 firm-
years for the test of our second hypothesis, H02. Appendix provides information on the 
number of clients and auditors in our sample by each state.  
4.2.   Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our earnings 
management measures, |DA1| and |DA2|, and three fee metrics, AFEE, NAFEE, and 
TFEE, separately, for the local auditor sample (DSTATE = 1) and the non-local auditor 
sample (DSTATE = 0), along with the results of univariate tests for differences in the 
mean and median between the two samples. As shown in Panel A, both |DA1| and |DA2| 
are significantly lower for clients of local auditors than those of non-local auditors. For 
example, the mean (median) value of |DA1| is 0.0903 (0.0516) for client of local 
auditors, and is 0.1100 (0.0584) for clients of non-local auditors. Their differences are 
significant at less than the 1% level.  Panel A also shows that clients of local auditors 
pay significantly higher audit fees, higher non-audit fees and thus higher total fees, 
compared with clients of non-local auditors. For example, the mean value (median) 
                                                 
9 The District of Columbia is counted as a state and included in the sample. Client firms whose 
headquarters are located in Alaska or Hawaii are included in the sample, but the exclusion of those firms 
from our sample doesn’t affect our results qualitatively. 
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values of AFEE and NAFEE for clients of local auditors are 5.8130 and 4.7414 (5.5677 
and 4.8760), respectively, while those for clients of non-local auditors are 5.5843 and 
4.3563 (5.3822 and 4.5466), respectively. These differences are significant at less than 
the 1% level.   
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE! ] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all other variables used in 
this study. With respect to the results reported in Panel B, the following are apparent. 
On average, about 85% of our sample observations are audited by local auditors located 
in the same state (DSTATE).10 The average distance between auditor and client (DIST) 
is 2.4226 which translate into 10.28 miles. However, when we calculate the distance 
using raw miles without log transformation, the average distance is about 91 miles. In 
our sample, about 9% of clients (LONG_DIST) are audited by auditors located at least 
150 miles away from the headquarter city of the client.11 The average client size (LNTA) 
is 12.0947 which is equivalent to about 179 million dollars. In our sample, about 81% 
of clients are audited by one of Big 4 auditors (BIG4), and the average auditor tenure 
                                                 
10 Though not tabulated, we find that the percentage of firm-years audited by the in-state local auditors 
varies substantially from state to state, and that the percentage is, overall, higher for large states than for 
small states. For example, the percentage is 95%, 93%, and 87% for California, Texas, and Florida, 
respectively. In contrast, the states in the Northeast area tend to have a lower percentage of in-state local 
auditors. For example, the proportion is 40% for Maryland, 72% for New York, 76% for New Jersey and 
Virginia, and 81% for Pennsylvania.   
 
11 To check if there is any special reason to hire long-distance, non-local auditors, we choose the state of 
California (where the state-by-state sample size is the largest) and identify clients that hire auditors 
located at least 300 miles away from client headquarters. We find that a total of 50 clients firms (101 
observations) belong to this category. For these firms, we search for 10-Ks from the EDGAR database to 
see if these firms have special connections with the states where their auditors come from. We find that, 
out of 50 client firms, 16 have major offices or plants in the states where their auditors are located, 4 
moved headquarters to California from different states, but continued to hire their previous auditors. 
However, we are unable to find any compelling evidence that the remaining 30 clients have any special 
connections to the states where their auditors come from. We control for this potential endogenous choice 
of local auditors as part of sensitivity checks. (See section 6.) 
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(TENURE) is 1.8892 which is equivalent to about 6 years. On average, non-audit 
service fees are about 66% of total fees (NAS), and about 42% of clients hire industry 
specialists (INDSPEC). We do not offer explanations for the descriptive statistics for 
other variables in Table 2, for brevity, as they are self-explanatory.   
Panel A of Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix among all research 
variables included in Eq. (3). The two abnormal accruals measures, |DA1| and |DA2|, are 
highly correlated with the correlation coefficient of 0.4294 (p<0.01). The auditor 
locality indicator, DSTATE, is significantly negatively correlated with |DA1| and |DA2| 
with the correlation coefficients of -0.0602 and -0.0456, respectively (p < 0.001 for 
both). 12  As shown in Table 3, both |DA1| and |DA2| are significantly negatively 
correlated with client size (LNTA), the Big 4 auditor dummy (BIG4), auditor tenure  
(TENURE), the industry specialty dummy (INDSPEC), and non-audit fees (NAS), 
suggesting that these variables positively affect audit quality.  
In addition, we find that both |DA1| and |DA2| are positively (negatively) 
correlated with CHGSALE (BTM), suggesting that high-growth firms engage more 
aggressively in opportunistic earning management, compared with low-growth firms.  
Consistent with evidence in previous research, we find that both |DA1| and |DA2| are 
positively correlated with leverage (LEV), potential financial distress (LOSS), and 
external financing activities (ISSUE), while they are negatively correlated with lagged 
                                                 
12 We do not separately report the correlations for the DIST and LONG_DIST variables in Panels A and B 
of Table 3 for brevity. As expected, DIST (LONG_DIST) is positively correlated with both |DA1| and 
|DA2| with Pearson correlation coefficients of 0.0680 and 0.0604 (0.0716 and 0.0612), respectively. The 
DIST (LONG_DIST) is negatively related with DSTATE with the Pearson correlation coefficient of -
0.5524 (-0.6068) and the correlation between DIST and LONG_DIST is 0.6724. For the DIST and 
LONG_DIST variables, the correlations with other control variables are similar to those between DSTATE 
and the control variables, except the sign is opposite. Among them, the highest correlation is -0.1677 
between DIST and LNTA. The above mentioned correlations are all significant at less than the 1% level.  
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abnormal accruals (LAGACCR).  Finally, we note that the correlation among our 
explanatory variables is not very high in its magnitude with the correlation between 
BTM and CFO of -0.4982 being the highest. This suggests that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to be a serious problem when estimating Eq. (3).   
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE! ] 
Panel B of Table 3 presents part of the Pearson correlations among the variables 
included in Eq. (4). The structure of correlations reported in Panel B can be summarized 
as follows: First, as expected, all three fee metrics, i.e., AFEE, NAFEE, and TFEE, are 
highly correlated with each other. Second, all three fee metrics are significantly 
positively correlated with our measure of auditor locality, DSTATE, suggesting that 
local auditors are likely to charge higher fees than non-local auditors.13 Third, consistent 
with previous research, all three fee metrics are positively correlated with BIG4 and 
INDSPEC, which suggests that there exist fee premiums for Big 4 auditors and Big 4 
industry specialists, respectively. Finally, consistent with our expectation, our fee 
metrics are positively correlated with client size (LNTA), the scope and complexity of 
client business (NBS, NGS, FOREIGN, and EXORD), and client-specific risk (LEV). 
Contrary to our expectations, we find that our three fee metrics are negatively correlated 
with INVREC and LOSS, and positively correlated with ROA.  We find, however, that 
when we control for client size (LNTA), the negative correlations of our fee metrics with 
INVREC and LOSS become positive and the positive correlation between our fee 
                                                 
13 Although not separately tabulated for brevity, all the three fee measures are significantly correlated 
with DIST and LONG_DIST at less than the 1% level. For example, the correlation between DIST 
(LONG_DIST) and AFEE, NAFEE, and TFEE is -0.1435, -0.1321, and -0.1478 (-0.0925, -0.1083, and -
0.1031), respectively. Both DIST and LONG_DIST are also significantly correlated with several control 
variables. The highest correlation among them is -0.1764 between DIST and LNTA. 
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metrics and ROA becomes negative, which is consistent with our priors.14 Finally, we 
find that our fee metrics are negatively correlated with the auditor change indicator (AC), 
suggesting that newly hired auditors charge lower fees.   
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Main results for testing hypothesis H01 
 Table 4 reports the results of regression in Eq. (3). In section A (B), |DA1| 
(|DA2|) is used as the dependent variable. All reported t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity by using the White (1980) method and serial correlations by using 
clustering procedures. We begin with the results reported in section A. We first estimate 
Eq. (3) after excluding our test variable, namely DSTATE, and then estimate Eq. (3) 
after including it. The results are reported in columns (1a) and (2a), respectively.   
As shown in column (2a), the coefficient on DSTATE is significantly negative at 
less than the 1% level (-0.0114 with t = -2.98). This leads to a failure to reject our null 
hypothesis, H01, and indicates that local auditors are more effective than non-local 
auditors in deterring opportunistic earnings management after controlling for all other 
factors. A comparison between columns (1a) and (2a) reveals that the inclusion of 
DSTATE improves the explanatory power of the model (measured by adjusted R2) 
without changing the magnitude and significance of coefficients on all other control 
variables. The significant coefficient on DSTATE, along with the increase in the 
adjusted R2, suggests that auditor locality is an important factor determining audit 
quality even after controlling for other engagement-specific factors such as client size 
                                                 
14 For example, the partial correlation (after controlling for LNTA) is 0.1211 between AFEE and INVREC 
(p < 0.001); 0.0803 between AFEE and LOSS (p < 0.001); and -0.1607 between AFEE and ROA (p < 
0.001). 
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(LNTA), auditor reputation and industry expertise (BIG 4 and INDSPEC), and the 
relative important of non-audit fees (NAS), and other control variables.  
   To further examine whether the ability of local auditors to constrain 
opportunistic earnings management differs systematically between clients with income-
increasing abnormal accruals and those with income-decreasing abnormal accruals, we 
split the full sample into two sub-samples with positive and negative abnormal accruals 
(i.e., DA1 > and DA1 < 0), and then estimate Eq. (3) separately for the two sub-samples. 
Columns (3a) and (4a) report the regression results for the sub-samples of clients with 
DA1 > 0 and DA1 < 0, respectively.  We find that the coefficient on DSTATE is highly 
significant with a negative sign for both sub-samples, suggesting that local auditors are 
more effective in constraining both income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal 
accruals, compared with non-local auditors. The significantly negative coefficient on 
DSTATE across all cases in Table 4  are consistent with the notion that the audit quality-
improving effect of auditor locality through reducing information asymmetry (the 
information perspective) dominates the audit quality-impairing effect of auditor locality 
through facilitating the collusion between auditors and clients (the collusion 
perspective).  
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE! ] 
The coefficients on the control variables are, overall, in line with evidence 
reported in prior earnings management research. The coefficient on LNTA is highly 
significant with a negative sign across all four columns, suggesting that large client 
firms are involved in aggressive earnings management to a lesser extent, compared with 
small clients (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002). As shown in column (2a), the coefficient 
on BIG4 is insignificantly negative (t = -1.02) when Eq. (3) is estimated using the full 
 26
sample of clients. When we split the full sample into the two sub-samples with DA1 > 0 
and DA1 < 0,  however, the coefficient on BIG4 becomes significantly negative for the 
sub-sample with DA1 > 0 (t = -1.94), but it is insignificant for the sub-sample with DA1 
< 0 (t = 0.82). This asymmetry in the effect of BIG4 on abnormal accruals is consistent 
with the finding of Kim et al. (2003) that Big 4 auditors are more effective than non-Big 
4 auditors in constraining income-increasing earnings management, but they are no 
more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in constraining income-decreasing earnings 
management.15 Our results provide mixed evidence on the effect of auditor tenure on 
audit quality: The coefficient on TENURE is insignificantly negative for the full sample 
and the sub-sample with DA1 > 0, while it is significantly negative for the sub-sample 
with DA1 < 0. This suggests that long-tenure auditors are better able to constrain 
earnings management than short-tenure auditors only when clients are actively involved 
in income-decreasing earnings management. We find that across all four columns in 
section A, the coefficient on NAS is insignificant. This is consistent with the majority of 
previous non-audit fee studies that document no significant relation between non-audit 
fees and audit quality (e.g., Chung and Kallapur 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 2004; Reynolds 
et al. 2004). The coefficient on INDSPEC is highly significant with a negative sign 
across all four columns. This is consistent with prior evidence that industry specialists 
provide higher-quality audits than non-specialist (Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2004).   
                                                 
15 Kim et al. (2003) argue that Big 4 auditors prefer income understatement to income overstatement, 
because their failures to detect income overstatement likely result in litigation while failures to detect 
income understatement do not. They further argue that when clients have income-increasing (income-
decreasing) incentives, the conflict of interest (the convergence of interest) arises between auditors and 
clients. They provide evidence that Big 4 auditors are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in 
constraining opportunistic earnings management through income-increasing accrual choices only when 
clients have incentives to choose income-increasing accruals. 
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With respect to the estimated coefficients on other control variables, the 
following are noteworthy. The coefficient on BTM (CHGSALE) is significantly negative 
(positive), which supports the view that high-growth firms manage earnings more 
aggressively than low-growth firms. The coefficients on LOSS，LEV, and ISSUE are all 
significantly positive, suggesting that client firms are more likely to engage in  earnings 
management when they have potential financial distress and high debts and when they 
are involved actively in financing transactions such as equity and bond offerings. 
Consistent with evidence reported in previous research (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2003), the coefficients on CFO and LAGACCR are 
highly significant with negative signs.  
Section B of Table 4 reports the regression results using |DA2| as the dependent 
variable. Overall, the results indicate that the effect of audit locality on audit quality in 
terms of deterring opportunistic earnings management is robust to the use of alternative 
proxies for earnings management. The coefficient on DSTATE is significantly negative 
for the full sample (t = -2.14), the sub-sample with |DA2| > 0 (t = -1.84), and the sub-
sample with |DA2| < 0 (t = -1.71), though the level of significance is a bit lower when 
|DA2| is used than when |DA1| is used.  
With respect to the coefficients on control variables in section B, the following 
is noteworthy. First, while the coefficient on BIG4 is insignificantly negative when 
|DA1| is used as shown in column (2a), it becomes significantly negative when |DA2| is 
used with t = -3.17. We find, however, that the coefficient on BIG4 is significantly 
negative for the sub-sample with |DA2| > 0, but it is insignificant for the sub-sample 
with |DA2| < 0, which is consistent with the results reported in section A and Kim et 
al.’s (2003) findings. Second, while the coefficient on INDSPEC is highly significant 
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with a negative sign when |DA1| is used (as reported in section A), it becomes 
insignificantly negative at the conventional level when |DA2| is used. Finally, we 
observe that the significance levels of the coefficients on LEV, ISSUE, and LAGACCR 
vary from section A (when |DA1| is used) to section B (when |DA2| is used), though the 
signs of the coefficients on these variables remain unchanged regardless of whether 
|DA1| or |DA2| is used as the dependent variable.     
5.2. Sensitivity checks using alternative measures of auditor locality 
To check the robustness of the results reported in Table 4, we perform 
sensitivity tests using alternative proxies for auditor locality. For this purpose, we 
compute actual geographical distances in miles between two cities where the practicing 
office of an audit engagement and a client’s headquarter are located. Table 5 reports the 
results (with t-statistics corrected for serial correlations and heteroskedasticity) when the 
DSTATE variable is replaced by (the natural log of ) the exact distance in miles between 
the two city centers (DIST) or by the distance indicator variable (LONG_DIST) which 
equals 1 if DIST is greater than 150 miles and 0 otherwise.16 Section A (B) presents the 
results using |DA1| (|DA2|) as the dependent variable.   
As shown in columns (1a) and (2a) of section A, we find the coefficient on DIST 
is insignificant, but the coefficient on LONG_DIST is significant with a positive sign at 
less than the 5% level. This suggests that the geographical proximity between auditors 
and clients is a significant factor influencing audit quality (in terms of deterring 
earnings management) only when the distance between an auditor’s practicing office 
                                                 
16 We choose the 150 miles as a cut-off because 150 miles is about 2 hours’ driving distance and it is 
about the maximum boundary that a person can commute. Our results, however, are not sensitive to the 
choice of alternative thresholds. For example, when we choose 100 (200) miles as a threshold, the 
coefficient on LONG_DIST is 0.0080 (0.0113) with t = 1.98 (2.19) for the regression in column (2a). 
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and a client’ headquarter is beyond the 150-mile geographic boundary. To further 
examine the above issue, we include both DIST and the interaction between DIST and 
LONG_DIST in Eq. (3) in replacement of DSTATE. The result is reported in column 
(3a). Here, the coefficient on DIST (say δ1) captures the effect of the distance on audit 
quality for clients whose headquarters are located within 150 miles away from their 
auditors (hereafter, short-distance clients), while the coefficient on DIST*LONG_DIST 
(say δ2) captures the incremental effect of the distance on audit quality for clients whose 
headquarters are located at least 150 miles away from their auditors (hereafter, long-
distance clients). As shown in column (3a), when both variables are included, δ1 is 
insignificant, while δ2 becomes significant with a positive sign. Note here that the (total) 
effect of the distance on audit quality for long-distance clients is captured by the sum of 
the two coefficients, i.e., (δ1 + δ2). The partial F-test reveals that the sum of these 
coefficients is significantly different from zero (F = 4.99 with p = 0.0289). The above 
results, as a whole, can be interpreted as follows: the geographic distance does not 
matter when the auditor and the client are located within a relatively short-distance, 
geographic boundary (δ1 = 0), while it does matter when the auditor-client distance are 
beyond a certain boundary (δ2 > 0). For long-distance clients, the longer is the auditor-
client distance, the higher is the magnitude of abnormal accruals, and thus, the lower is 
the audit quality (δ1 + δ2 > 0).           
As shown in section B, the use of |DA2| does not alter our statistical inferences 
on the test variables. The coefficients on DIST, LONG_DIST, and DIST*LONG_DIST  
reported in section B are qualitatively similar to those reported in section A.17 With 
                                                 
17  The partial F-value for testing the significance of the sum of the two coefficients DIST and 
DIST*LONG_DIST (i.e., δ1 + δ2) is 3.40 (p = 0.0653) for the regression reported in column (3b).   
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respect to the estimated coefficients on our control variables, the results are qualitatively 
identical with those reported in Table 4. We therefore do not repeat the discussions on 
the control variables. In sum, the results in Tables 4 and 5, taken together, indicate that 
the locality of auditor is a significant engagement-specific factor that maps into the 
auditor-client relationship even after all the control variables are accounted for, and the 
results are robust to the use of alternative measures of abnormal accruals and auditor 
locality.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE!] 
As further sensitivity checks, we also estimate Eq. (3), using the performance 
unadjusted abnormal accruals as the dependent variable (i.e., using the modified Jones 
model in Eq. (2) as specified in Dechow et al. (1995)). We also run the median-quantile 
regression, the Fama-MacBeth regression, and year-by-year regressions after excluding 
year dummies. We repeat our tests, separately, for the sub-sample of Big 4 clients and 
for the sub-sample of non-Big 4 clients. Though untabulated, the results from these 
robustness checks are, overall, qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4.18 
5.3. Main results for testing hypothesis H02 
Table 6 reports the results of regression in Eq. (4). In section A, audit fee 
(AFEE) is used as the dependent variable, while in sections B and C, non-audit fee 
(NAFEE) and total fee (TFEE = natural log of audit fees plus non-audit fees) are used, 
respectively. As in Tables 5 and 6, all reported t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations.  
                                                 
18  For example, the coefficient on DSTATE for the regression in column (2a) of Table 4 is -0.0154 with t 
= -3.33, -0.0056 with t = -1.96, and -.0111 with t = -2.99, respectively, for the regression using the 
performance unadjusted abnormal accruals as the dependent variable, for the meadian quantile regression, 
and for the Fama-MacBeth regression.   
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As shown in Table 6, the coefficient on DSTATE is insignificant across all three 
columns, which leads to a failure to reject our null hypothesis, H02. The failure to reject 
H02, along with the rejection of H01, indicates that while local auditors provide higher-
quality audits than non-local auditors, local auditors do not charge higher fees to their 
clients than non-local auditors. We interpret this result as follows: Given that audit fees 
reflect audit quality, local auditors (of high quality) should be able to charge higher fees 
than non-local auditors (of low quality), other things being equal. However, one may 
not observe a fee premium associated with local audits if local auditors are able to 
deliver the same-quality audits at a lower cost, compared with non-local auditors. As 
mentioned in section 2, local auditors have cost advantages relative to non-local 
auditors because of the geographic proximity between local auditors and clients, which 
allows local auditors to charge lower fees to their clients. Our results in Table 6 are 
consistent with the view that cost savings associated with local audits are sufficiently 
large to offset the associated fee premiums resulting from high-quality, local audits. In 
short, our results in Tables 4 and 6, taken as whole, suggest that local audits improve 
audit quality without incurring additional costs to local clients. To this extent, local 
audits can be considered ‘socially beneficial.’   
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE!] 
With respect to the estimated coefficients on control variables, the following are 
apparent. We note that all control variables except for |DA1*| are, overall, highly 
significant with expected signs across all three columns (i.e., regardless of three 
alternative fee metrics used), and are consistent with the findings in previous audit fee 
research. The coefficients on LNTA and EMPLOY are significantly positive, confirming 
that fees paid to auditors increase with client size. The coefficients on BIG4 and 
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INDSPEC are highly significant with expected positive signs. This indicates that Big 4 
auditors and industry specialists enjoy fee premiums relative to non-Big 4 auditors and 
non-specialists, respectively. The coefficients on NBS, NGS, INVREC, FOREIGN, and 
EXORD are significantly positive, which is consistent with the finding of previous 
research that auditors charge higher fees to clients whose business are diversified, 
geographically dispersed, or complex (e.g., Choi et al. 2006a). The coefficients on 
LOSS and LEV (ROA) are significantly positive (negative), indicating that auditors 
charge higher fees for high-risk clients. The positive (negative) coefficient we observe 
on ISSUE (BTM) suggests that auditors charge higher fees for such clients that are 
involved in capital transactions (clients with high growth potentials). We observe that 
the coefficient on the predicted value of abnormal accruals (|DA 1*|) is insignificant 
with a positive sign.  
5.4. Sensitivity checks using alternative measures of auditor locality 
To check whether the results reported in Table 6 are robust to alternative proxies 
for auditor locality, we estimate Eq. (4) using DIST and LONG_DIST instead of 
DSTATE. Sections A, B, and C of Table 7 report the results for the full sample of both 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients, the sub-sample of Big 4 clients, and the sub-sample of non-
Big 4 clients, respectively, using AFEE as the dependent variable. A comparison of the 
full sample results reported in section A of both Tables 6 and 7 reveals that the use of 
alternative proxies does not alter our statistical inferences on the effect of auditor 
locality on audit quality. As shown in section A of Table 7, the DIST, LONG_DIST and 
DIST * LONG_DIST are all insignificant, which is consistent with the results reported 
in section A of Table 6.    
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE!] 
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When we split the full sample into the sub-sample of Big 4 clients and the sub-
sample of non-Big 4 clients, the coefficient on DIST is insignificant across all cases. 
However, the coefficient on LONG_DIST is significantly positive (0.0568 with t = 2.41) 
for the Big 4 sub-sample as shown in column (4), but not for the non-Big 4 sub-sample 
as shown in column (6). As shown in columns (3), (5), and (7), the coefficients on DIST 
and LONG_DIST are both individually insignificant across all three columns. Note here 
that in the regressions reported in columns (3), (5), and (7) of Table 7, the coefficient on 
DIST (say γ1) captures the effect of the auditor-client distance on audit fees for short-
distance clients, while the coefficient on DIST*LONG_DIST (say γ2) captures the 
incremental effect of the distance on audit fees for long-distance clients.  
As such, the total effect of the distance on audit fees for long-distance clients is 
captured by the sum of the two coefficients, i.e., (γ1 + γ2).  When we compute the partial 
F-statistics for testing for the significance of (γ1 + γ2) for the regressions in columns (3), 
(5) and (7), the sum of the two coefficients, i.e., (γ1 + γ2), is significant only for the 
regression for the Big 4 sub-sample in column (5) (F = 4.99 with p = 0.0256), but not 
for the regressions for the full sample and the non_Big 4 sub-sample in columns (3) and 
(7), respectively. The significance of (γ1 + γ2), along with the significantly positive 
coefficient on LONG_DIST, only for the Big 4 sub-sample, indicate that local Big 4 
auditors which are located within 150 miles away from the clients’ headquarters charge 
lower fees than other Big 4 auditors located at least 150 miles away. It appears that the 
cost savings by local Big 4 auditors are sufficiently larger than the amount of fee 
premium arising from high-quality local audits. Note, however, that as shown in section 
C, there is no significant fee difference between local non-Big 4 auditors and non-local 
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non-Big 4 auditors. 19 This suggests that, among local auditors, Big 4 auditors are more 
cost-efficient in producing audit services to their clients than non-Big 4 auditors.   
Though not reported, the coefficients on DIST, DIST*LONG, and 
DIST*LONG_DIST are all insignificant when NAFEE or TFEE are used as the 
dependent variable. With respect to the coefficients on control variables, the results in 
Table 7 are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 6 except that the coefficient 
on INDSPEC is insignificant for the sub-sample of non-Big 5 auditors. This 
insignificance is as expected because in our sample, only a small portion of non-Big 4 
auditors are classified as industry specialists.20 
 
6. Further analysis on endogenous auditor choice  
To the extent that clients self-select local vs. non-local auditors and this 
selection decision is possibly influenced by their incentive for earnings management 
and their ability to pay audit fees, the coefficient on DSTATE in Eq. (3) and (4) are 
likely to suffer from a self-selection bias. To address this potential problem, we estimate 
both Eqs. (3) and (4) by applying the two-stage treatment effect model. In the first stage, 
we estimate a probit auditor-choice model, and compute inverse Mills ratios. In the 
second stage, we then re-estimate our main regressions in Eqs. (3) and (4). Given that 
we do not have a well-defined theory which helps us guide the selection of explanatory 
variables for the probit auditor-choice model, we posit that the choice of local vs. non-
                                                 
19 With respect to the results reported in column (7) of Table 7, the partial F-test reveals that the sum of 
the coefficients on DIST and DIST*LONG_DIST for non-Big 4 auditors is not significantly different from 
zero (F = 0.18 with p = 0.6732). 
 
20 Among 1,938 observations used for Section C, only 14% (281 observations) are classified as clients 
audited by industry specialist non-Big 4 auditors. This proportion is substantially lower than that of 50% 
for Big 4 auditors. 
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local auditors is determined by four client-specific factors, that is client size (LNTA), the 
degree of diversification (NBS), the leverage ratio (LEV) and the loss dummy (LOSS), 
two state-wide variables, that is the degree of audit market development in a state where 
a client is located (DAU) and auditors’ hourly wage (WAGE), and the indicator variable 
for the clients of Big 4 auditors (BIG4) as well as industry dummies,21 and then obtain 
the following coefficient estimates: 
   DSTATEjt* = 2.3430 + 0.0181*LNTAjt – 0.0889*NBSjt - 0.1453*LEVjt + 0.0015*LOSSjt 
                      (10.53***)  (1.92*)                (-2.47**)          (-4.42***)            (0.04) 
                      + 0.4460*BIG4jt + 5.9029*DAUst – 0.0779*WAGEst + Industry Dummies         (5) 
          (10.00***)            (18.36***)            (-9.85***)                                                         
where the subscripts, j and s, denote an individual firm and state, respectively, and the 
number in parenthesis denotes z-statistics.    
In Eq. (5), DSTATE * is the ex ante unobservable probability that a client 
chooses a local auditor, which is ex post coded as 1 for clients with local auditors, and 0 
for clients with non-local auditors. We include LNTA in Eq. (5) for the following 
reason: Other things being equal, large firms could easily hire local auditors, for 
example, because auditors are less likely to turn away large clients in the same locale. 
The NBS is used as a proxy for the degree of business diversification. Diversified firms 
are more likely to hire auditors from another state where one of their plants, offices or 
branches is located as explained before for the case of California clients. We thus expect 
a negative sign on NBS. We add LEV and LOSS because it would be more difficult for 
                                                 
21 We choose the variables included in the Eq. (5) after comparing the client-specific variables (the 
variables reported in Table 2) between the clients of local vs. non-local auditors. Adding additional 
variables to Eq. (5) do not increase the explanatory power (pseudo R2) of the model and subsequent 
regression results are almost identical. For example, when the predicted value of abnormal accruals (i.e., 
|DA1*｜) into the Eq. (5) to examine if clients with high DA prefer non-local auditors, the coefficient 
estimate for the variable is insignificant and there is almost no change in the results. 
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financially unhealthy or risky clients to hire local auditors if the local auditors are 
reluctant to serve such clients. Thus, we expect a negative coefficient both on LEV and 
LOSS. Because Big 4 auditors have offices in many different states, it is possible that 
the clients of Big 4 auditors would hire a Big 4 office in their own state rather than hire 
a Big 4 auditor office located in a different state which belongs to the same audit firm. 
Thus, we expect a positive sign on BIG4. DAU is used as a proxy for the level of audit 
market development in each client state, and is measured by total audit fees of all the 
clients located in a state in a given year divided by total audit fees of all the clients in 
the U.S. in the same year. We include DAU because clients are more likely to hire 
auditors from their own states if their states have a well-developed audit market. We 
therefore expect a positive sign on DAU. In Eq. (5), WAGE is measured by the median 
hourly auditor wage in a state where clients are headquartered. We include WAGE 
because clients in a state where the wage level is relatively high are more likely to hire 
auditors from a different state where the wage level is lower to save audit fees. We 
expect a negative sign on WAGE. We collect the data on the auditor wage from 
Occupational Employment Statistics (May 2005), published by the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. Finally, we include industry dummies to control 
for cross-industry differences in the demand for local audit services.22 As shown in Eq. 
(5), the coefficients on all independent variables are all significant with expected signs 
at less than the 10% level except for LOSS, though the pseudo R2 for Eq. (5) is 
relatively low (7.32%).  
                                                 
22 Industry dummies are determined by two-digit SIC code. The results without the industry dummies 
remain qualitatively identical to the results with them.  
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In the second stage, we add the inverse Mills ratios obtained from Eq. (5) as an 
additional control variable and re-estimate Eqs. (3) and (4). We find that the regression 
results for Eq. (3) after adding the inverse Mills ratios are qualitatively identical to those 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. For example, the coefficient on DSTATE for the full sample 
after including the inverse Mills ratios is -0.0127 with t = -3.18 (-0.0079 with t = -2.30) 
which is similar to the corresponding coefficient estimate (without the ratios)  reported 
in column (2a) [column (2b)] of Table 4. We find, however, that the regressions results 
for Eq. (4) after including the inverse Mills ratios are slightly different from those 
(without the inverse Mills ratios) reported in Tables 6 and 7. Table 8 presents the result 
for Eq. (4) with the inverse Mills ratios included, using AFEE as the dependent 
variable.23    
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE!] 
Sections A, B, and C of Table 8 report the results for the full sample, the Big 4 
sub-sample, and the non-Big 4 sub-sample, respectively. Unlike the results reported in 
section A of Table 6, the coefficient on DSTATE is significantly negative for the full 
sample (-0.0578 with t = -2.47) and the Big 4 sub-sample (-0.0650 with t = -2.45), while 
it is insignificant for the non-Big 4 sub-sample (-0.0298 with t = -0.66).24 In addition, 
though not tabulated, the coefficient on DSTATE is insignificant across all cases when 
NAFEE is used as the dependent variable. When TFEE is used the dependent variable, 
the coefficient on DSTATE is weakly significant for the full sample, significant for the 
                                                 
23 Note that the sample size slightly decreases to 9,983 in Table 8 from 10,072 due to data unavailability 
for some variables used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio. 
 
24 These different results are not due to the differences in sample size. When we perform the same 
analyses as those reported in Tables 6 and 7, using 9,983 firm-years used for regressions reported in Table 
8, the results do not change. For example, the coefficient on DSTATE is -0.0335 (t = -1.44) in this case, 
which is qualitatively identical with the reported coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 using 10,027 firm-years. 
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Big 4 sub-sample, and insignificant for the non-Big 4 sub-sample. The above results can 
be viewed as an indication that cost savings  from local Big 4 audits are sufficiently 
large to offset the amount of potential fee premium associated with high–quality, local 
audit. Consistent across all cases is that, for non-Big 4 auditors, no audit-fee difference 
exists between local and non-local auditors.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
While many studies have already examined the effect of locality or geographic 
proximity in the contexts of domestic and international portfolio decisions, analysts’ 
forecast accuracy, corporate governance, and other areas of economics, few previous 
studies have examined the issue in the context of auditor-client relationships. To our 
knowledge, our study is the first to consider the auditor locality or the geographic 
proximity between auditors and clients as an engagement-specific factor that maps into 
the auditor-client relationship in the U.S. audit market. On one hand, we posit that the 
locality or the geographic proximity has a positive effect on audit quality because it 
facilitates information flows between auditors and clients and thus alleviates 
information asymmetries between the two parties. On the other hand, we posit that the 
locality or the proximity has a negative effect on audit quality because it increases the 
possibility of collusion between auditors and clients. Our results show a positive effect 
on audit quality in the context of constraining opportunistic earnings management. This 
result supports the view that the audit quality-improving effect of auditor locality 
through reducing information asymmetry dominates the audit quality-impairing effect 
associated with the possibility that the locality or the proximity facilitates the collusion 
between auditors and clients.   
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Our study is also the first to connect the geographic distance to audit pricing. It 
is well known that the quality is priced in the market for professional services. On one 
hand, we posit that fees paid to auditors increase with the auditor-client proximity to the 
extent that the proximity increases audit quality. On the other hand, we posit that the 
fees decrease with the proximity to the extent that audit engagement costs decrease with 
the proximity. Our results show that the fees paid to local auditors are, overall, not 
significantly different from those paid to non-local auditors. Further analyses which 
control for endogenous auditor choices reveal that local Big 4 auditors charge lower 
audit fees (but not for non-audit or total fees) than non-local Big 4 auditors, but local 
non-Big 4 auditors charge as much audit, non-audit or total fees as non-local non-Big 4 
auditors. This finding is consistent with the view that, for Big 4 auditors, the cost 
savings associated with local audits are sufficiently larger than the amount of potential 
audit fee premiums arising from higher-quality local audits, thereby leading to a fee 
discount by local Big 4 auditors. Overall, our results indicate that local audits enhance 
audit quality without imposing additional costs/fees on clients in the same locale. To 
this extent, our results suggest that local audits are socially beneficial.  
In conclusion, our results help us better understand why local audits are so 
prevalent and Big 4 audit firms have continuously expanded their practicing offices to 
cities where their clients are headquartered in the U.S. as well as in the international 
arena. Evidence reported in this paper may be viewed as an indication that a close, 
auditor-client relationship does not necessarily impair auditor independence and thus 
audit quality, which is inconsistent with the argument advanced by proponents of the 
SOX. In this sense, our results provide a useful policy implication to regulators and 
lawmakers.  
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A fruitful extension of this paper would be to analyze the effect of auditors 
opening new offices near clients’ headquarters and clients switching auditor locations 
on audit quality and audit pricing. Interesting and intriguing is the question of what 
factors drive opening new offices and switching locations. Given the lack of evidence, it 
would also be useful to examine whether the mandated rotations of audit partners, as 
required under the SOX, lead to switching incumbent audit partners to new partners at 
the same office or at different offices in different cities within the same state (or in 
different states). We leave the above questions to future research.    
[INSERT APPENDIX HERE!] 
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   Appendix 
 
Panel A of Appendix reports the number of firm-year observations by the state of the 
client location and by the state of the auditor location. For example, the largest number of 
observations comes from the state of California (CA). There are 2,325 clients located in CA, 
whereas 2,321 clients from all over the U.S. are audited by auditors located in CA. Panel B of 
Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of the CA observations, which shows the 
number of clients located in CA that hire auditors from different states as well as the number of 
clients in different states that hire auditors located in CA. As shown in Panel B, about 95% 
(2,219/2,325) of the clients in CA hire auditors from CA. This percentage is substantially 
greater than the 85% calculated for our full sample.  
 
Panel A: The number of observations by client and auditor locations and by state 
 
 
State 
Number by 
client location 
Number by 
auditor location 
 
State 
Number by 
client location 
Number by 
auditor location 
AK 7 4 MT 12 7 
AL 51 45 NC 167 188 
AR 45 27 ND 4 0 
AZ 141 136 NE 52 56 
CA 2,325 2,321 NH 46 4 
CO 308 320 NJ 508 387 
CT 270 256 NM 13 7 
DC 23 16 NV 74 63 
DE 39 0 NY 876 1,047 
FL 500 468 OH 309 320 
GA 288 325 OK 73 83 
HI 11 11 OR 135 146 
IA 58 24 PA 471 513 
ID 20 3 RI 29 28 
IL 427 476 SC 55 42 
IN 101 94 SD 7 1 
KS 50 0 TN 138 114 
KY 60 49 TX 932 933 
LA 69 86 UT 99 131 
MA 686 747 VA 240 291 
MD 172 118 VT 18 2 
MI 228 201 WA 202 202 
MN 394 426 WI 158 142 
MO 175 234 WV 16 3 
MS 19 7 WY 7 4 
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Appendix (Continued) 
 
Panel B: The auditor location of California clients and the client location of 
California auditors  
 
 
State 
The auditor 
location of CA 
clients 
The client 
location of CA 
auditors 
 
State 
The auditor 
location of CA 
clients 
The client location 
of CA auditors 
AZ 8 5 NJ 4 0 
CA 2,219 2,219 NM 0 3 
CO 5 4 NV 2 6 
DC 0 4 NY 15 7 
DE 0 3 OH 0 3 
FL 10 5 OR 4 2 
GA 5 1 PA 10 6 
ID 0 3 TN 2 5 
IL 4 5 TX 7 12 
MA 10 6 UT 12 4 
MD 0 4 VA 1 6 
MI 0 1 WA 7 3 
MN 0 4 Total 2,325 2,321 
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Table 1:  Variable Definition and Measurement 
 
 
|DA| 
 
= 
 
absolute value of abnormal accruals. In the current study, there are two proxies: DA1 
and DA2.  DA1 is the abnormal accruals measured by Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) 
method; DA2 is the abnormal accruals measured by modified Jones model and 
adjusted for firm-performance (Kothari et al. 2005) 
 
|DA*| in Equation (4) is the predicted value of the model in Equation (3); 
 
DSTATE = an indicator variable for auditor location. 1 if the auditor and the client firm are 
located in the same state, 0 otherwise; 
 
DIST = the measure of exact distance, calculated as the natural log of (1+ distance between 
auditor and client in miles); 
 
LONG_DIST = an indicator variable for a long-distance between the auditor and the client. It equals 
1 if the distance between the client and its auditor is greater than 150 miles and 0 
otherwise; 
 
LNTA = natural log of total assets in thousand dollars; 
 
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of Big 4 firms, 0 otherwise; 
 
TENURE = auditor tenure, measured as the natural log of (1 + number of years); 
 
NAS = the relative importance of non-audit service, measured as the ratio of the natural log 
of non-audit fees over natural log of total fees; 
 
INDSPEC = an indicator variable for auditor industry expertise.  It equals to 1 if the audit firm is 
the industry leader for the audit year in the audit market of the state where the client 
is located, and 0 otherwise;  We calculate each audit firm’s industry market share of 
audit fees for a state as a proportion of audit fees earned by each firm in the total 
audit fees paid by all clients in the state that serve the same industry; Each industry 
is defined based on the two-digit SIC code; 
 
CHGSALE  = changes in sales deflated by lagged total assets; 
 
BTM = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
 
LOSS  = 1 if the firm reports a loss for the year, 0 otherwise; 
 
LEV = leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; 
 
ISSUE = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the 
total assets, 0 otherwise; 
 
CFO = operating cash flows, taken from the cash flow statement, deflated by lagged total 
assets; 
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Table 1:  Variable Definition and Measurement (Continued) 
 
FEE 
 
= 
 
natural log of fees paid to auditors. We try three proxies:  AFEE stands for audit 
fees (fees paid for the financial statement audits); NAFEE  is the non-audit fees; 
and TFEE is the total fees paid to the auditor; 
 
LAGACCR  = one-year lagged total accruals; Accruals are defined as income before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flows from the statement of cash flow 
deflated by lagged total assets; 
EMPLOY = square root of the number of employees; 
 
AC = an indicator variable for an auditor change. 1 if a firm’s auditor is in the first year 
of audit engagement and 0 otherwise; 
 
NBS = natural log of one plus number of business segments; 
 
NGS = natural log of one plus number of geographic segments; 
 
INVREC  = inventory and receivables divided by total assets;  
 
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise; 
 
EXORD = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 otherwise; 
ROA  = return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by average total 
assets); 
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Table 2    
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for the Differences between 
Local and Non-local Audits 
 
 DSTATE = 1a DSTATE = 0 b Test for Equality 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. t-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
│DA 1│ 0.0903 0.0516 0.1103 0.1100 0.0584 0.1070 -6.36*** -3.57*** 
│DA 2│ 0.1139 0.0794 0.1070 0.1280 0.0916 0.1401 -4.82*** -4.03*** 
AFEE 5.8130 5.6776 1.3169 5.5843 5.3822 1.3564 6.18*** 6.68*** 
NAFEE 4.7414 4.8760 2.1110 4.3563 4.5466 2.3250 6.41*** 6.22*** 
TFEE 6.2796 6.1965 1.4154 6.0186 5.8275 1.4992 6.53*** 7.13 *** 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables c 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% Median 75% 99% 
DSTATE 0.8542 0.3529 0 1 1 1 1 
DIST 2.4226 1.9590 0 0 2.6821 3.4535 7.6338 
LONG_DIST 0.0889 0.2847 0 0 0 0 1 
LNTA 12.0947 2.1741 7.6109 10.5510 12.0270 13.5502 17.3075 
BIG4 0.8079 0.3940 0 1 1 1 1 
TENURE 1.8892 0.9133 0 1.3863 1.9459 2.4849 3.4657 
NAS 0.6614 0.2539 0 0.6103 0.7406 0.8211 0.9563 
INDSPEC 0.4246 0.4943 0 0 0 1 1 
CHGSALE 0.0584 0.4281 -0.8782 -0.0525 0.0341 0.1478 1.2125 
BTM 0.6264 0.6730 0 0.2268 0.4442 0.7769 4 
LOSS 0.4670 0.4989 0 0 0 1 1 
LEV 0.5188 0.4472 0.0428 0.2546 0.4526 0.6538 2.1674 
ISSUE 0.4169 0.4931 0 0 0 1 1 
CFO 0.0202 0.2420 -0.8720 -0.0305 0.0654 0.1338 0.4320 
LAGACCR -0.1241 0.5796 -1.2558 -0.1433 -0.0725 -0.0253 0.3459 
AC 0.1082 0.3107 0 0 0 0 1 
NBS 1.0055 0.4706 0 0.6931 0.6931 1.3863 2.0794 
NGS 0.9859 0.6303 0 0.6931 1.0986 1.3863 2.3026 
INVREC 0.2539 0.1833 0 0.1043 0.2276 0.3625 0.7576 
EMPLOY 49.1113 65.7530 2 12.3288 26.4575 59.2874 329 
ROA -0.0859 0.3250 -1.2619 -0.1297 0.0130 0.0644 0.2732 
FOREIGN 0.4576 0.4982 0 0 0 1 1 
EXORD 0.2144 0.4104 0 0 0 0 1 
 
***, ** and * denote p-value<1%, <5% and <10% with two-tailed tests, respectively.  
a The sample size is 9,489 for │DA 1│ and │DA 2│and 8,517 firm-year observations for other variables. 
b The sample size is 1,619 for │DA 1│ and │DA 2│and 1,509 firm-year observations for other variables. 
c The sample size is 11,108 for twelve variables from LNTA to LAGACCR and 10,027 firm-year observations for 
other eight variables from AC to EXORD. 
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Table 3  
Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A: The Pearson Correlations between Earnings Management, Auditor Locality and Other Control Factors 
 
 │DA 1│ │DA 2│ DSTATE LNTA BIG4 TENURE NAS IND-
SPEC 
CHG-
SALE 
BTM LOSS LEV ISSUE CFO 
│DA 2│ 0.4294 
(<0.001) 
 
 
 
            
DSTATE -0.0602 
(<0.001) 
-0.0456 
(<0.001) 
 
            
LNTA -0.3120 
(<0.001) 
-0.2995 
(<0.001) 
0.0611 
(<0.001) 
 
           
BIG4 -0.1648 
(<0.001) 
-0.1701 
(<0.001) 
0.1405 
(<0.001) 
0.5017 
(<0.001) 
 
          
TENURE -0.1105 
(<0.001) 
-0.0817 
(<0.001) 
0.0238 
(0.012) 
0.2553 
(<0.001) 
0.2553 
(<0.001) 
 
         
NAS -0.1233 
(<0.001) 
-0.1190 
(<0.001) 
0.0087 
(0.358) 
0.4368 
(<0.001) 
0.3019 
(<0.001) 
0.0141 
(0.137) 
 
        
INDSPEC -0.1499 
(<0.001) 
-0.1163 
(<0.001) 
-0.0395 
(<0.001) 
0.3219 
(<0.001) 
0.2747 
(<0.001) 
0.1342 
(<0.001) 
 
0.1555 
(<0.001) 
       
CHGSALE 0.0254 
(0.0075) 
0.0053 
(0.576) 
0.0013 
(0.894) 
0.0529 
(<0.001) 
-0.0120 
(0.206) 
 
-0.0021 
(0.824) 
0.0273 
(0.004) 
0.0141 
(0.138) 
      
BTM -0.0843 
(<0.001) 
-0.0716 
(<0.001) 
0.0132 
(0.164) 
-0.0839 
(<0.001) 
-0.0591 
(<0.001) 
-0.0175 
(0.065) 
-0.1195 
(<0.001) 
-0.0200 
(0.035) 
-0.1418 
(<0.001) 
 
  
 
   
LOSS 0.2569 
(<0.001) 
0.1925 
(<0.001) 
-0.0189 
(0.046) 
-0.3155 
(<0.001) 
-0.1005 
(<0.001) 
-0.1297 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.1521 
(<0.001) 
-0.1010 
(<0.001) 
-0.1876 
(<0.001) 
0.1038 
(<0.001) 
    
LEV 0.1358 
(<0.001) 
0.0574 
(<0.001) 
-0.0784 
(<0.001) 
-0.0315 
(0.001) 
-0.1211 
(<0.001) 
-0.0505 
(<0.001) 
-0.0610 
(<0.001) 
0.0490 
(<0.001) 
-0.0449 
(<0.001) 
-0.1834 
(<0.001) 
0.1209 
(<0.001) 
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ISSUE 0.0638 
(<0.001) 
0.0597 
(<0.001) 
-0.0543 
(<0.001) 
0.0182 
(0.055) 
-0.0201 
(0.034) 
-0.0206 
(0.030) 
0.0195 
(0.040) 
0.0386 
(<0.001) 
0.0990 
(<0.001) 
-0.1488 
(<0.001) 
0.0672 
(<0.001) 
0.1644 
(<0.001) 
 
  
CFO -0.2593 
(<0.001) 
-0.2136 
(<0.001) 
0.0295 
(0.002) 
0.3574 
(<0.001) 
0.1343 
(<0.001) 
0.0976 
(<0.001) 
0.1271 
(<0.001) 
0.0990 
(<0.001) 
0.1397 
(<0.001) 
-0.4982 
(<0.001) 
-0.1747 
(<0.001) 
-0.1747 
(<0.001) 
0.0470 
(<0.001) 
 
 
LAGACCR -0.1520 
(<0.001) 
-0.0551 
(<0.001) 
0.0079 
(0.407) 
0.0594 
(<0.001) 
0.0205 
(0.031) 
0.0595 
(<0.001) 
0.0197 
(0.038) 
0.0153 
(0.106) 
-0.0047 
(0.621) 
-0.1081 
(<0.001) 
-0.0327 
(0.006) 
-0.0327 
(0.001) 
0.0342 
(<0.001) 
0.1224 
(<0.001) 
 
 
 
Panel B: The Pearson Correlations between Fees Paid to Auditors, Auditor Locality and Other Control Factors 
 
 NAFEE TFEE DSTATE LNTA EMPLOY BIG4 INDSPEC AC NBS 
AFEE 0.7053 
(<0.001) 
0.9566 
(<0.001) 
0.0616 
(<0.001) 
0.8309 
(<0.001) 
0.6736 
(<0.001) 
0.4607 
(<0.001) 
0.3060 
(<0.001) 
-0.1431 
(<0.001) 
0.2341 
(<0.001) 
NAFEE  0.8467 
(<0.001) 
0.0639 
(<0.001) 
0.7457 
(<0.001) 
0.5823 
(<0.001) 
0.4590 
(<0.001) 
0.2503 
(<0.001) 
-0.2123 
(<0.001) 
0.1990 
(<0.001) 
TFEE   0.0651 
(<0.001) 
0.8673 
(<0.001) 
0.6966 
(<0.001) 
0.4920 
(<0.001) 
0.3065 
(<0.001) 
-0.1633 
(<0.001) 
0.2371 
(<0.001) 
DSTATE    0.0671 
(<0.001) 
0.0369 
(<0.001) 
0.1366 
(<0.001) 
-0.0385 
(<0.001) 
-0.0123 
(0.218) 
-0.0161 
(0.107) 
          
 NGS INVREC LOSS LEV ROA ISSUE BTM FOREIGN EXORD 
AFEE 0.4189 
(<0.001) 
-0.0983 
(<0.001) 
-0.2165 
(<0.001) 
0.0799 
(<0.001) 
0.2411 
(<0.001) 
0.0306 
(0.0021) 
-0.1559 
(<0.001) 
0.5256 
(<0.001) 
0.2233 
(<0.001) 
NAFEE 0.3794 
(<0.001) 
-0.0875 
(<0.001) 
-0.2064 
(<0.001) 
0.0173 
(0.083) 
0.2340 
(<0.001) 
0.0096 
(0.337) 
-0.1075 
(<0.001) 
0.4892 
(<0.001) 
0.1861 
(<0.001) 
TFEE 0.4320 
(<0.001) 
-0.1095 
(<0.001) 
-0.2256 
(<0.001) 
0.0646 
(<0.001) 
0.2553 
(<0.001) 
0.0314 
(0.002) 
-0.1514 
(<0.001) 
0.5499 
(<0.001) 
0.2327 
(<0.001) 
DSTATE 0.0808 
(<0.001) 
0.0095 
(0.340) 
-0.0205 
(0.040) 
-0.0769 
(<0.001) 
0.0396 
(<0.001) 
-0.0518 
(<0.001) 
0.0111 
(0.265) 
0.0916 
(<0.001) 
-0.0186 
(0.062) 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Auditor Locality and Audit Quality 
 
  Section A 
Using |DA 1| as the dependent variable 
Section B 
Using  |DA 2| as the dependent variable 
 Expected 
Sign 
(1a) 
Full Sample 
 
(2a) 
Full Sample 
 
(3a) 
Sub-sample 
with DA1 > 0 
(4a) 
Sub-sample 
with DA1 < 0 
(1b) 
Full Sample 
 
(2b) 
Full Sample 
 
(3b) 
Sub-sample 
with DA2 > 0 
(4b) 
Sub-sample 
with DA2 < 0 
DSTATE ?  -0.0114 
(-2.98***) 
 
-0.0133 
(-2.70***) 
-0.0103 
(-2.03**) 
 -0.0069 
(-2.14**) 
 
-0.0072 
(-1.84*) 
-0.0074 
(-1.71*) 
LNTA - -0.0116 
(-14.97***) 
-0.0116 
(-14.93***) 
 
-0.0134 
(-12.80***) 
-0.0091 
(-8.61***) 
-0.0114 
(-16.85***) 
-0.0114 
(-16.78***) 
 
-0.0141 
(-14.52***) 
-0.0089 
(-9.51***) 
BIG4 - -0.0056 
(-1.43) 
-0.0040 
(-1.02) 
 
-0.0101 
(-1.94*) 
0.0045 
(0.82) 
-0.0119 
(-3.48***) 
-0.0109 
(-3.17***) 
 
-0.0204 
(-4.49***) 
0.0036 
(0.70) 
TENURE 
 
- -0.0009 
(-0.78) 
-0.0009 
(-0.81) 
0.0009 
(0.58) 
-0.0035 
(-2.13**) 
 
0.0007 
(0.58) 
0.0007 
(0.56) 
0.0029 
(1.94*) 
-0.0022 
(-1.28) 
 
NAS 
 
? 0.0057 
(1.24) 
0.0051 
(1.10) 
-0.0002 
(-0.03) 
0.0052 
(0.82) 
 
0.0034 
(0.76) 
0.0030 
(0.67) 
-0.0053 
(-0.91) 
0.0108 
(1.68*) 
 
INDSPEC - -0.0120 
(-5.46***) 
-0.0127 
(-5.73***) 
 
-0.0107 
(-3.68***) 
-0.0137 
(-4.28***) 
-0.0029 
(-1.34) 
-0.0030 
(-1.50) 
 
-0.0033 
(-1.16) 
-0.0031 
(-0.97) 
CHGSALE + 0.0195 
(2.91***) 
0.0195 
(2.93***) 
 
0.0331 
(3.29***) 
 
0.0096 
(1.16) 
 
0.0085 
(2.08**) 
 
0.0085 
(2.09**) 
 
0.0145 
(2.70***) 
0.0019 
(0.29) 
 
BTM - -0.0145 
(-8.66***) 
-0.0144 
(-8.63***) 
 
-0.0129 
(-5.09***) 
-0.0156 
(-7.46***) 
-0.0136 
(-8.27***) 
-0.0136 
(-8.26***) 
 
-0.0122 
(-5.66***) 
-0.0142 
(-5.84***) 
LOSS + 0.0261 
(8.49***) 
0.0261 
(8.51***) 
 
-0.0176 
(-3.39***) 
0.0621 
(18.18***) 
0.0165 
(6.59***) 
0.0165 
(6.60***) 
 
-0.0027 
(-0.77) 
0.0350 
(9.22***) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
 
LEV + 0.0233 
(4.72***) 
0.0229 
(4.65***) 
 
0.0090 
(1.57) 
0.0343 
(5.06***) 
0.0049 
(1.70*) 
0.0047 
(1.63) 
 
0.0003 
(0.08) 
0.0073 
(1.60) 
ISSUE + 0.0021 
(0.93) 
0.0018 
(0.80) 
 
0.0054 
(1.82*) 
-0.0006 
(-0.19) 
0.0053 
(2.51**) 
0.0051 
(2.42**) 
 
0.0061 
(2.20**) 
0.0040 
(1.30) 
CFO - -0.0441 
(-3.71***) 
-0.0442 
(-3.73***) 
 
-0.0976 
(-5.35***) 
-0.0058 
(-0.39) 
-0.0328 
(-4.52***) 
-0.0329 
(-4.52***) 
 
-0.0943 
(-7.46***) 
0.0294 
(2.29**) 
LAGACCR - -0.0190 
(-5.03***) 
-0.0190 
(-5.06***) 
 
-0.0027 
(-0.46) 
-0.0223 
(-3.71***) 
-0.0021 
(-1.06) 
-0.0021 
(-1.06) 
 
0.0074 
(1.59) 
-0.0037 
(-1.26) 
Intercept ? 0.2283 
(25.57***) 
0.2372 
(24.43***) 
 
0.2894 
(21.82***) 
0.2315 
(13.51***) 
0.2649 
(31.88***) 
0.2702 
(31.20***) 
 
0.3116 
(26.10***) 
0.2241 
(18.56***) 
Industry & Year 
Dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  11,108 11,108 
 
5,834 5,274 11,108 11,108 
 
5,603 5,505 
Adj.R2  0.1870 0.1882 
 
0.2024 0.2315 0.1306 0.1310 
 
0.2261 0.0894 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering procedure to correct for serial correlation and White’s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
****, **, * denote p-value <1%, <5%, and <10%, respectively with two-tailed tests.  
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Table 5 
Auditor Locality and Audit Quality: Sensitivity Analyses 
 
  Section A  
Using |DA 1 | as the dependent variable 
Section B 
Using |DA 2| as the dependent variable 
 Expected 
Sign 
(1a) 
 
(2a) 
 
(3a) 
 
(1b) 
 
(2b) 
 
(3b) 
 
DIST ? 0.0006 
(0.98) 
 -0.0007 
(-1.12) 
0.0005 
(0.82) 
 -0.0006 
(-0.91) 
 
LONG_DIST 
 
 
?  0.0114 
(2.44**) 
  0.0086 
(2.12**) 
 
DIST* 
LONG_DIST 
 
?   0.0022 
(2.76***) 
  0.0017 
(2.35**) 
LNTA - -0.0116 
(-14.85***) 
-0.0115 
(-14.87***) 
 
-0.0116 
(-14.89***) 
-0.0114 
(-16.69***) 
-0.0113 
(-16.74***) 
-0.0114 
(-16.73***) 
 
BIG4 - -0.0053 
(-1.34) 
-0.0043 
(-1.09) 
 
-0.0044 
(-1.11) 
-0.0116 
(-3.39***) 
-0.0109 
(-3.18***) 
-0.0109 
(-3.19***) 
 
TENURE 
 
- -0.0009 
(-0.78) 
-0.0009 
(-0.82) 
-0.0009 
(-0.82) 
0.0007 
(0.58) 
 
0.0006 
(0.55) 
0.0006 
(0.55) 
NAS 
 
? 0.0056 
(1.22) 
0.0055 
(1.19) 
0.0055 
(1.20) 
0.0033 
(0.74) 
 
0.0032 
(0.72) 
0.0032 
(0.73) 
INDSPEC - -0.0121 
(-5.48***) 
-0.0125 
(-5.65***) 
 
-0.0125 
(-5.65***) 
-0.0030 
(-1.35) 
-0.0033 
(-1.49) 
-0.0033 
(-1.51) 
 
CHGSALE + 0.0195 
(2.92***) 
0.0195 
(2.94***) 
 
0.0195 
(2.93***) 
 
0.0084 
(2.08**) 
 
0.0085 
(2.10**) 
 
0.0085 
(2.10**) 
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BTM - -0.0145 
(-8.66***) 
-0.0145 
(-8.64***) 
 
-0.0145 
(-8.66***) 
-0.0136 
(-8.27***) 
-0.0136 
(-8.27***) 
-0.0136 
(-8.28***) 
 
LOSS + 0.0260 
(8.48***) 
0.0259 
(8.44***) 
 
0.0259 
(8.43***) 
0.0165 
(6.58***) 
0.0164 
(6.55***) 
0.0164 
(6.53***) 
 
LEV + 0.0233 
(4.73***) 
0.0230 
(4.67***) 
 
0.0230 
(4.65***) 
0.0049 
(1.71*) 
0.0047 
(1.63) 
0.0047 
(1.61) 
 
ISSUE + 0.0020 
(0.91) 
0.0018 
(0.83) 
 
0.0018 
(0.83) 
0.0053 
(2.49**) 
0.0051 
(2.42**) 
0.0051 
(2.43**) 
 
CFO - -0.0442 
(-3.72***) 
-0.0443 
(-3.73***) 
 
-0.0441 
(-3.72***) 
-0.0329 
(-4.53***) 
-0.0329 
(-4.53***) 
-0.0328 
(-4.52***) 
 
LAGACCR - -0.0190 
(-5.03***) 
-0.0189 
(-5.06***) 
 
-0.0189 
(-5.07***) 
-0.0021 
(-1.05) 
-0.0021 
(-1.04) 
-0.0021 
(-1.04) 
 
Intercept ? 0.2259 
(24.67***) 
0.2260 
(25.48***) 
 
0.2284 
(24.61***) 
0.2630 
(30.40***) 
0.2631 
(31.61***) 
0.2650 
(30.41***) 
 
Industry & Year 
Dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  11,108 11,108 
 
11,108 11,108 11,108 11,108 
 
Adj.R2  0.1871 0.1878 
 
0.1878 0.1306 0.1311 0.1311 
 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering procedure to correct for serial correlation and White’s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
****, **, * denote p-value <1%, <5%, and <10%, respectively with two-tailed tests.  
Test for DIST + DIST*LONG_DIST = 0: F = 4.77 with p = 0.0289 in column (3a) and F = 3.40 with p = 0.0653 in column (3b). 
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Table 6   
Auditor Locality and Audit Pricing  
 
 Expected 
 Sign 
Section  A 
AFEE as the dep. 
variable 
Section B 
NAFEE as the dep. 
variable 
Section C 
TFEE as the dep. 
variables 
DSTATE ? -0.0288 
(-1.24) 
-0.0066 
(-0.13) 
-0.0269 
(-1.12) 
LNTA + 0.3926 
(37.00***) 
0.6011 
(29.25***) 
0.4546 
(42.54***) 
EMPLOY + 0.0028 
(9.15***) 
0.0023 
(4.97***) 
0.0028 
(8.88***) 
BIG4 + 0.3264 
(11.58***) 
0.3899 
(6.31***) 
0.3198 
(11.40***) 
INDSPEC 
 
+ 0.0903 
(5.08***) 
0.0063 
(0.17) 
0.0655 
(3.66***) 
AC 
 
- -0.1831 
(-7.50***) 
-0.9139 
(-15.56***) 
-0.2866 
(-12.17***) 
NBS + 0.0847 
(4.33***) 
0.0613 
(1.65) 
0.0694 
(3.57***) 
NGS + 0.1484 
(8.81***) 
0.1919 
(5.26***) 
0.1495 
(8.57***) 
INVREC + 0.4185 
(7.39***) 
0.3382 
(2.53**) 
0.3498 
(5.92***) 
FOREIGN + 0.2276 
(10.28***) 
0.4391 
(8.95***) 
0.2815 
(12.37***) 
EXORD + 0.1647 
(9.56***) 
0.1768 
(4.85***) 
0.1831 
(10.43***) 
LOSS + 0.1247 
(5.68***) 
0.0135 
(0.29) 
0.1013 
(4.81***) 
LEV + 0.1542 
(6.49***) 
0.0732 
(1.40) 
0.1309 
(5.53***) 
ROA - -0.2803 
(-5.70***) 
-0.3384 
(-4.52***) 
-0.2791 
(-6.14***) 
ISSUE + 0.0144 
(1.02) 
0.0538 
(1.72*) 
0.0381 
(2.65***) 
BTM - -0.0638 
(-4.52***) 
-0.1725 
(-5.00***) 
-0.0994 
(-7.08***) 
|DA 1*| 
 
+ 0.3991 
(0.93) 
0.3853 
(0.42) 
0.5716 
(1.50) 
Intercept ? 0.6069 
(4.27***) 
-3.6509 
(-12.61***) 
0.1608 
(1.17) 
Industry & 
Year dummies 
 Included Included Included 
N  10,027 10,027 10,027 
R2  0.8132 0.6307 0.8345 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering procedure to correct for serial correlation and 
White’s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
****, **, * denote p-value <1%, <5%, and <10%, respectively with two-tailed tests.  
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Table 7  
Auditor Locality and Audit Pricing: Sensitivity Analyses with Audit Fees 
Section A 
Full sample 
Section B 
Big 4 clients only 
Section C 
Non-Big 4 clients only 
 
Independent 
variable 
 
Expected 
sign (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DIST ? 0.0058 
(1.36) 
 
 0.0026 
(0.44) 
 
 
0.0027 
(0.43) 
 0.0053 
(0.39) 
LONG_DIST   ?  0.0397 
(1.49) 
 
 0.0568 
(2.41**) 
 0.0177 
(0.38) 
 
DIST* 
LONG_DIST  
?   0.0053 
(0.88) 
 
 0.0089 
(1.32) 
 -0.0017 
(-0.15) 
LNTA + 0.3929 
(37.00***) 
 
0.3928 
(37.04***) 
0.3930 
(37.05***) 
0.3908 
(30.93***) 
0.3910 
(30.93***) 
0.3741 
(15.15***) 
0.3739 
(15.11***) 
EMPLOY + 0.0029 
(9.11***) 
 
0.0028 
(9.14***) 
0.0028 
(9.12***) 
0.0029 
(8.87***) 
0.0029 
(8.85***) 
0.0041 
(2.05**) 
0.0041 
(2.05**) 
BIG4 + 0.3259 
(11.52***) 
 
0.3271 
(11.55***) 
0.3279 
(11.58***) 
- - - - 
INDSPEC + 0.0916 
(5.15***) 
 
0.0902 
(5.07***) 
0.0905 
(5.08***) 
0.1035 
(5.37***) 
0.1037 
(5.39***) 
-0.0288 
(-0.54) 
-0.0269 
(-0.50) 
AC - -0.1833 
(-7.50***) 
 
-0.1831 
(-7.50***) 
-0.1831 
(-7.50***) 
-0.2043 
(-6.65***) 
-0.2046 
(-6.66***) 
-0.0732 
(-1.91*) 
-0.0731 
(-1.90*) 
NBS + 0.0850 
(4.36***) 
 
0.0853 
(4.37***) 
0.0851 
(4.36***) 
0.0748 
(3.64***) 
0.0747 
(3.63***) 
0.1115 
(2.23**) 
0.1102 
(2.21**) 
NGS + 0.1478 
(8.76***) 
 
0.1481 
(8.78***) 
0.1480 
(8.77***) 
0.1431 
(7.68***) 
0.1429 
(7.66***) 
0.1669 
(4.64***) 
0.1666 
(4.64***) 
INVREC + 0.4174 
(7.37***) 
 
0.4198 
(7.41***) 
0.4200 
(7.40***) 
0.4314 
(6.20***) 
0.4313 
(6.20***) 
0.2796 
(2.89***) 
0.2786 
(2.88***) 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
FOREIGN + 0.2275 
(10.28***) 
 
0.2279 
(10.28***) 
0.2280 
(10.29***) 
0.2158 
(9.05***) 
0.2161 
(9.06***) 
0.2653 
(4.58***) 
0.2651 
(4.58***) 
EXORD + 0.1656 
(9.61***) 
 
0.1648 
(9.56***) 
0.1650 
(9.58***) 
0.1580 
(8.77***) 
0.1583 
(8.79***) 
0.1656 
(3.47***) 
0.1657 
(3.47***) 
LOSS + 0.1244 
(5.66***) 
 
0.1242 
(5.65***) 
0.1241 
(5.64***) 
0.0899 
(3.43***) 
0.0897 
(3.43***) 
0.1903 
(4.39***) 
0.1902 
(4.39***) 
LEV + 0.1253 
(6.53***) 
 
0.1541 
(6.48***) 
0.1544 
(6.49***) 
0.2607 
(7.19***) 
0.2607 
(7.19***) 
0.0914 
(2.91***) 
0.0919 
(2.91***) 
ROA - -0.2801 
(-5.69***) 
 
-0.2802 
(-5.69***) 
-0.2802 
(-5.69***) 
-0.3888 
(-5.49***) 
-0.3889 
(-5.51***) 
-0.1928 
(-3.47***) 
-0.1928 
(-3.47***) 
ISSUE + 0.0146 
(1.03) 
 
0.0144 
(1.02) 
0.0143 
(1.01) 
0.0102 
(0.68) 
0.0100 
(0.66) 
0.0379 
(1.07) 
0.0382 
(1.08) 
BTM - -0.0638 
(-4.51***) 
 
-0.0640 
(-4.53***) 
-0.0639 
(-4.53***) 
-0.0626 
(-3.55***) 
-0.0626 
(-3.55***) 
-0.0914 
(-3.61***) 
-0.0913 
(-3.59***) 
|DA 1*| + 0.3940 
(0.91) 
 
0.3984 
(0.92) 
0.3955 
(0.92) 
0.6648 
(1.03) 
0.6638 
(1.03) 
-0.4483 
(-0.58) 
-0.4516 
(-0.58) 
Intercept ? 0.5642 
(3.98***) 
 
0.5752 
(4.07***) 
0.5675 
(4.00***) 
0.9637 
(5.13***) 
0.9557 
(5.08***) 
0.6063 
(2.16**) 
0.5984 
(2.12**) 
Industry & 
Year dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  10,027 10,027 10,027 8,088 8,088 1,938 1,938 
R2  0.8132 0.8132 0.8132 0.8025 0.8026 0.5623 0.5626 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering procedure to correct for serial correlation and White’s (1980) method to correct for 
heteroskedasticity.   
****, **, * denote p-value <1%, <5%, and <10%, respectively with two-tailed tests.  
Test for DIST + DIST *LONG_DIST = 0: F = 2.97 with p = 0.0849 in column (3), F = 4.99 with p = 0.0256 in column (5) and F = 0.18 with p = 0.6732 in 
column (7). 
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Table 8  
Auditor Locality and Audit Pricing: Control for Endogenous Auditor Choice 
 
AFEE as the dependent variable  
Independent 
variable 
 
Expected 
 sign 
Section A 
Full sample 
Section B 
Big 4 clients only 
Section C 
Non-Big 4  
clients only 
DSTATE ? -0.0578 
(-2.47**) 
-0.0650 
(-2.45**) 
-0.0298 
(-0.66) 
LNTA + 0.3888 
(36.44***) 
0.3875 
(30.48***) 
0.3706 
(15.04***) 
EMPLOY + 0.0029 
(9.05***) 
0.0029 
(8.78***) 
0.0041 
(2.10**) 
BIG4 + 0.2573 
(8.20***) 
- - 
INDSPEC 
 
+ 0.0956 
(5.38***) 
0.1083 
(5.63***) 
-0.0112 
(-0.22) 
AC 
 
- -0.1819 
(-7.46***) 
-0.1972 
(-6.43***) 
-0.0816 
(-2.12**) 
NBS + 0.0964 
(4.88***) 
0.0842 
(4.03***) 
0.1206 
(2.43**) 
NGS + 0.1463 
(8.65***) 
0.1418 
(7.59***) 
0.1640 
(4.57***) 
INVREC + 0.4230 
(7.48***) 
0.4353 
(6.24***) 
0.2791 
(2.91***) 
FOREIGN + 0.2270 
(10.25***) 
0.2143 
(8.98***) 
0.2592 
(4.51***) 
EXORD + 0.1623 
(9.39***) 
0.1579 
(8.72***) 
0.1520 
(3.19***) 
LOSS + 0.1259 
(5.78***) 
0.0915 
(3.52***) 
0.1951 
(4.53***) 
LEV + 0.1843 
(7.48***) 
0.2872 
(7.73***) 
0.1266 
(3.78***) 
ROA - -0.2748 
(-5.72***) 
-0.3844 
(-5.54***) 
-0.1859 
(-3.44***) 
ISSUE + 0.0131 
(0.92) 
0.0088 
(0.58) 
0.0396 
(1.12) 
BTM - -0.0638 
(-4.54***) 
-0.0630 
(-3.59***) 
-0.0903 
(-3.62***) 
|DA 1*| 
 
+ 0.3605 
(0.84) 
0.6234 
(0.98) 
-0.4923 
(-0.64) 
INVMR 
 
? -0.4163 
(-4.70***) 
-0.3742 
(-3.43***) 
-0.4628 
(-3.43***) 
Intercept ? 0.8096 
(5.46***) 
1.1245 
(5.88***) 
0.8282 
(2.79***) 
Industry & 
Year dummies 
 Included Included Included 
N  9,983 8,046 1,937 
R2  0.8141 0.8031 0.5676 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering procedure to correct for serial correlation and White’s (1980) 
method to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
****, **, * denote p-value <1%, <5%, and <10%, respectively with two-tailed tests.  
